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trade remedies, on which agreement was reached only during the final hours of negotiations. 
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Summary
On June 30, 2007, United States Trade Representative Susan Schwab and South
Korean Foreign Trade Minister Kim Hyung-chong signed the proposed U.S.-South
Korean Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA) for their respective countries.  If
approved, the KORUS FTA would be the largest FTA that South Korea has signed
to date and would be the second largest (next to North American Free Trade
Agreement NAFTA) in which the United States participates.  South Korea is the
seventh-largest trading partner of the United States and the United States is South
Korea’s third largest trading partner.  Various studies conclude that the agreement
would increase bilateral trade and investment flows.
The final text of the proposed KORUS FTA covers a wide range of trade and
investment issues and, therefore, could have wide economic implications for both the
United States and South Korea.  The KORUS FTA includes issues on which the two
countries achieved early agreement, such as the elimination on tariffs on trade in
most manufactured goods and the partial liberalization in services trade.  The
agreement also includes provisions on a number of very sensitive issues, such as
autos, agriculture, and trade remedies, on which agreement was reached only during
the final hours of negotiations.
If the agreement is to enter into force, Congress will have to approve
implementation legislation.  The negotiations were conducted under the trade
promotion authority (TPA), also called fast-track trade authority, that the Congress
granted the President under the Bipartisan Trade Promotion Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-
210).  The authority allows the President to enter into trade agreements that receive
expedited congressional consideration (no amendments and limited debate).  The
White House has not indicated when it will send the draft implementing legislation
to Congress.  (The TPA sets no deadline for the President to do this.)
While a broad swath of the U.S. business community supports the agreement,
the KORUS FTA faces opposition from some groups, including some auto and steel
manufacturers and  labor unions.  In addition, the agricultural community and some
Members of Congress have withheld support for the agreement until South Korea
lifts its restrictions on imports of U.S. beef.  Some U.S. supporters view passage of
the KORUS FTA as important to secure new opportunities in the South Korea
market.  Opponents claim that the KORUS FTA does not go far enough in opening
up the South Korean market and is a lost opportunity to resolve long running
concerns about South Korean barriers.  Other observers have suggested the outcome
of the KORUS FTA could have implications for the U.S.-South Korean alliance as
a whole.
Differences between the White House and the Democratic leadership in the
Congress over the implications of the KORUS FTA have made the timing and even
the likelihood of the President’s submission and the Congress’s subsequent
consideration of implementing legislation uncertain.  This report will be updated as
events warrant.
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The Proposed U.S. South Korea Free Trade
Agreement (KORUS FTA): Provisions and
Implications
On June 30, 2007, United States Trade Representative Susan Schwab and South
Korean Foreign Trade Minister Kim Hyung-chong signed the proposed U.S.-South
Korean Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA) for their respective countries.1  If
approved, the KORUS FTA would be the largest FTA South Korea has signed to date
and would be the second largest (next to the North American Free Trade Agreement)
in which the United States currently participates.  South Korea is the United States’s
seventh-largest trading partner and the KORUS FTA, if enacted, is expected to
expand bilateral trade and investment flows according to some studies.
The final text of the proposed free trade agreement (FTA) covers a wide range
of trade and investment issues and, therefore, could have wide economic implications
for both the United States and South Korea.  The subjects include ones on which the
two countries achieved early agreement, such as the elimination on tariffs on trade
in most manufactured goods and the liberalization in services trade.  But the text also
includes a number of very sensitive issues on which agreement was reached only
during the final hours of negotiations — autos, agriculture, and trade remedies,
among others.
Congress will have to approve implementation legislation for the KORUS FTA
before it can enter into force.  The negotiations were conducted under the trade
promotion authority (TPA), also called fast-track trade authority, that the Congress
granted the President under the Bipartisan Trade Promotion Act of 2002 (the act)
(P.L. 107-210).  The authority allows the President to enter into trade agreements that
receive expedited congressional consideration (no amendments and limited debate).
The White House has not indicated when it will send the draft implementing
legislation to Congress.  (The TPA sets no deadline for the President to do this.)  In
December 2007, South Korea’s sitting president and president-elect said they hope
to have the South Korean National Assembly consider, and pass, the agreement in
February 2008.
The United States and South Korea entered into the KORUS FTA as a means
to further solidify an already strong economic relationship by reducing barriers to
trade and investment between them and to resolve long festering economic issues.
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The United States specifically has sought increased access to South Korean markets
for agricultural products, services, and foreign investment.  Of importance to South
Korea was change in U.S. trade remedy procedures which it considers to be
discriminatory and U.S. recognition of products made in an industrial park in North
Korea as eligible for preferential treatment under the KORUS FTA.
Supporters of the FTA argue that failure to approve the KORUS FTA would
allow those opportunities to slip away.  Some opponents of the KORUS FTA have
argued that the agreement failed to go far enough in addressing South Korean trade
barriers and would be a lost opportunity if approved in its current form. A
congressionally mandated study by the United States International Trade Commission
(USITC) concluded that investment and trade between the United States and South
Korea would increase modestly as a result of the KORUS FTA.2  This result is in line
with other similar studies.
Many observers have argued that in addition to economic implications, the
KORUS FTA would have diplomatic and security implications.  For example, they
have suggested that it would help to deepen the U.S.-South Korean alliance.  The
United States and South Korea have been allies since the United States intervened
on the Korean Peninsula in 1950 and fought to repel a North Korean takeover of
South Korea.  Over 33,000 U.S. troops were killed and over 100,000 were wounded
during the three-year conflict.3  South Korea subsequently has assisted U.S.
deployments in other conflicts, most recently by deploying over 3,000 troops to play
a non-combat role in Iraq.  Some have also suggested that a KORUS FTA would help
to solidify the U.S. presence in East Asia to counterbalance the increasing influence
of China while failure to pass it could harm the alliance.
This report is designed to assist Members of the 110th Congress as they consider
the costs and benefits of the KORUS FTA.  It examines the provisions KORUS FTA
in the context of the overall U.S.-South Korean economic relationship, U.S.
objectives, and South Korean objectives.  The report will be updated as events
warrant.
The KORUS FTA in a Nutshell
The KORUS FTA was the product of much compromise.  As negotiators from
both countries stated, each country was able to accomplish some of its objectives, but
neither side got everything it wanted.  For example, South Korea made concessions
in agriculture and services while the United States made concessions on rice and
textiles.  Yet, U.S. car manufacturers felt that South Korea did not go far enough in
addressing barriers to auto imports and South Korea would have liked to have more
U.S. concessions on trade remedies.
CRS-3
Some highlights of the results of the agreement are provided below.
Background information on a more detailed examination of the agreement’s
provisions is provided in the main sections of this report.
Agriculture
Under the KORUS FTA's agricultural provisions, South Korea immediately
would grant duty-free status to almost two-thirds of current U.S. agricultural exports.
Tariffs and import quotas on most other agricultural goods would be phased out
within 10 years, with the remaining commodities and products subject to provisions
that phase out such protection by year 23.  Seven U.S. products (skim and whole milk
powders, evaporated milk, in-season oranges, potatoes for table use, honey, and
identity-preserved soybeans for food use) would be subject to import quotas that
slowly expand in perpetuity.
Much effort went into negotiating provisions covering three agricultural
commodities of export interest to the United States.  Under the KORUS FTA, South
Korea agreed to eliminate its 40% tariff on beef muscle meats imported from the
United States over a 15 year period.  Also, South Korea would have the right to
impose safeguard tariffs on a temporary basis in response to any potential surge in
imports of U.S. beef meats above specified levels.  However, negotiators did not
reach a breakthrough on the separate but parallel issue of resolving differences on the
terms of access for U.S. beef that would address Korea's human health concerns
arising from the 2003 discovery of mad cow disease in the U.S. cattle herd.  Though
South Korea's President Roh promised President Bush that his country would open
up its market at a reasonable level once an international animal health body presented
its findings on the risk status of mad cow in the U.S. cattle herd, retail sales of U.S.
boneless beef now permitted to enter are on hold.  This status could change once
South Korea finalizes its risk assessment and both countries revise an earlier
agreement laying out the rules applicable to U.S. beef imports.
The KORUS FTA does not give U.S. rice and rice products any preferential
access to South Korea's market.  The agreement only requires South Korea to
continue to abide by its multilateral trade commitments to increase rice imports.
Access for U.S. citrus products was not settled until just before the talks concluded.
With South Korea protecting its orange sector by a 50% tariff, negotiators
compromised on a multi-part solution.  A small duty free quota was created for "in
season" U.S. navel oranges that would grow slowly in perpetuity.  Sales during this
September to February period in excess of this quota would face the high 50% tariff.
For "out-of-season" oranges that pose less competition to South Korea's orange
producing sector, the tariff would be phased out by year 7.
Automobiles 
Trade in autos and autoparts proved to be among the most difficult issues
tackled by U.S. and South Korean negotiators, pitting an increasingly competitive
South Korean industry seeking to increase its market share in the United States and
a U.S. industry that wants South Korea to eliminate policies and practices that
seemingly discriminate against U.S. auto imports.  The KORUS FTA would:
CRS-4
4
 Trade Remedy Piece of Korea FTA Ignores Korean ADF Demands.   Inside U.S. Trade.
April 13, 2007. 
! eliminate most South Korean tariffs on U.S.-made motor vehicles.
South Korea would immediately eliminate its 8% tariff on U.S.-built
passenger cars and its 10% tariff on pickup trucks.
! reduce discriminatory effects of engine displacement taxes.  South
Korea would simplify its three-tier “Special Consumption Tax” and
would also simplify its five-tier “Annual Vehicle Tax” both of which
are based on engine displacement by making it a three-tier system.
! harmonize standards and create an“Automotive Working Group.”
The agreement provides for self-certification on safety and emissions
standards for a limited number of U.S.-exported vehicles, and a
commitment that South Korea will evaluate emissions using the
methodology applied by the State of California.  South Korea also
agreed “not to adopt technical regulations that create unnecessary
barriers to trade and to cooperate to harmonize standards.”
! eliminate of U.S. tariffs and provide for “snapback” clause.  The
United States would immediately eliminate its 2.5% duty on
gasoline-fueled passenger vehicles with engine displacement up to
3000 cc, would phase out over three years the 2.5% duty on South
Korean imports with larger engine capacity or that are diesel-
powered , and would phase out over ten years the 25% duty on South
Korean pickup trucks.
Other Key Provisions
The KORUS FTA would cover a broad range of other areas.  According to the
Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR), most U.S.-South Korean
trade in consumer and industrial products would become duty-free within three
years after the agreement enters into force, and virtually all remaining tariffs would
be lifted within 10 years.  The two countries agreed to liberalize trade in services by
opening up their markets beyond what they have committed to do in the World Trade
Organization (WTO).  About 60% of U.S.-South Korea trade in textiles and apparel
would  become duty-free immediately, and the KORUS FTA would provide a special
safeguard mechanism to reduce the impact textile and apparel import surges.
Trade remedies were a critical issue for South Korea and a sensitive issue for
the United States.  The FTA provides the United States could exempt imports from
South Korea from a “global” escape clause (section 201) measure if they are not a
major cause of serious injury or a threat of serious injury to the U.S. domestic
industry.  The FTA would also provide for a binational consultative committee to
review trade remedy decisions involving one another.4
In addition, South Korea and the United States agreed to establish an
independent body to review recommendations and determinations regarding South
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Korean pricing and government reimbursement for pharmaceuticals and medical
devices and to improve transparency in the process for making those determinations.
Furthermore, one year after the KORUS FTA enters into force, a binational
committee would be formed to study the possibility of eventually including products
from “Outward Processing Zones, ” such as the Kaesong Industrial Complex, that
use North Korean labor.
Estimates of the Overall Economic Effects of a
KORUS FTA
Economists have released several studies estimating the potential effects of the
KORUS FTA.  As required by the TPA statute, the USITC conducted a study of the
KORUS FTA at the request of the President.5  The USITC study concludes that U.S.
GDP would increase by $10.1 billion to $11.9 billion (approximately 0.1%) when the
KORUS FTA is fully implemented, a negligible amount given the size of the U.S.
economy.  The USITC based this estimate primarily on the removal of tariffs and
tariff-rate-quotas, that is, barriers that can be relatively easily quantified.  The study
concludes that U.S. exports of goods would likely increase by $9.7 billion to $10.9
billion primarily in agricultural products, machinery, electronics, transportation
equipment, including passenger vehicles and parts.  U.S. imports would increase $6.4
billion to $6.9 billion, primarily in textiles, apparel, leather products, footwear,
machinery, electronics, and passenger vehicles and parts.6
The range does not take into account the impact of the reduction of barriers to
trade in services and to foreign investment flows and the impact of changes in
regulations as a result of the KORUS FTA.  The study notes that U.S. exports in
services would increase as a result of South Korean commitments under the KORUS
FTA and that changes in the regulatory environment in both countries would also
help to increase bilateral trade and investment flows.
The study estimates that changes in aggregate U.S. employment would be
negligible given the much larger size of the U.S. economy compared to the South
Korean economy.  However, while some sectors, such as live stock producers, would
experience increases in employment, others such as textile, wearing apparel, and
electronic equipment manufacturers would be expected to experience declines in
employment.7
Other studies draw the same basic conclusions, although the magnitudes differ
because they employ different models from the USITC study.  For example, a
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University of Michigan analysis commissioned by the Korea Economic Institute
estimates that U.S. GDP would increase by $25.12 billion (0.14% of U.S. GDP).
This is larger than the USITC estimate, but in part this is because its authors
quantified the effects of liberalization in services trade.8  The authors also analyzed
the impact of a KORUS FTA before the final text had been released and assumed,
among other things, that rice trade would be liberalized, which, in the end, was not
the case.
In December 2005, the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
published a study measuring the potential economic impact of a U.S.-South Korean
FTA on South Korea alone.  The study estimated some of the dynamic, or long-run,
economic effects in addition to the static, or one-time, effects of the FTA on South
Korea.  The KIEP study estimated that the FTA would eventually lead to a 0.42% to
0.59% increase in South Korea’s GDP according to a static analysis, and 1.99 to
2.27% according to a dynamic analysis.9
An Overview of the U.S.-South Korean Economic
Relationship
South Korea is a major economic partner for the United States.  In 2006, two-
way trade between the two countries exceeded $75 billion, making South Korea the
United States’s seventh-largest trading partner. (See Table 1.)  South Korea is among
the United States’s largest markets for agricultural products.  Major U.S. exports to
South Korea include semiconductors, machinery (particularly semiconductor
production machinery), aircraft, and agricultural products.
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Table 1.  Annual U.S.-South Korea Merchandise Trade,
 Selected Years
(Billions of U.S. Dollars)
Year U.S. Exports U.S. Imports
Trade
balance
Total
trade
1990 14.4 18.5 -4.1 32.9
1995 25.4 24.2 1.2 49.6
2000 26.3 39.8 -13.5 66.1
2003 22.5 36.9 -14.4 59.5
2004 25.0 45.1 -20.1 70.1
2005 26.2 43.2 -17.0 69.4
2006 30.8   44.7  -13.9   75.5   
Major U.S. Export
Items
Semiconductor chips and manufacturing equipment; aircraft; corn
and wheat; plastics.  (See Appendix C for more details.)
Major U.S. Import
Items
Semiconductor circuits; televisions and flat panel screens; cars;
steel.  (See Appendix C for more details.)
Sources: 1990 and 1995 data from Global Trade Information Services.  2000-2006 data from U.S.
International Trade Commission.
South Korea is far more dependent economically on the United States than the
United States is on South Korea.  In 2006, the United States was South Korea’s third-
largest trading partner, second-largest export market, and the third-largest source of
imports. It was also South Korea’s second largest supplier of foreign direct
investment (FDI).  In 2003, China for the first time displaced the United States from
its perennial place as South Korea’s number one trading partner.  In 2005 Japan
overtook the United States to become South Korea’s second-largest trade partner.
Table 2.  Asymmetrical Economic Interdependence (2006)
Total
Trade
Export
Market
Source of
Imports
Source
of FDI
 For the U.S., 
 South Korea ranks #7 #7 #7
#28
(2004)
 For South Korea,     
 the U.S. ranks #3 #2 #3 #2
Sources: U.S. Department of Commerce, U.S. Census Bureau and Bureau of
Economic Analysis; Bank of Korea.  
Increased economic interaction between the United States and South Korea has
been accompanied by numerous disagreements over trade policies.  In general, U.S.
exporters and trade negotiators identify the lack of transparency of South Korea’s
trading and regulatory systems as the most significant barriers to trade with South
Korea in almost every major product sector.  Many U.S. government officials also
complain that Seoul continues to use government regulations and standard-setting
powers to discriminate against foreign firms in politically sensitive industries, such
as automobiles and telecommunications.  Another major cross-sectoral complaint is
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that rigidities in the South Korean labor market, such as mandatory severance pay,
raise the cost of investing and doing business.  Finally, the United States and other
countries have pressed South Korea to open further its agricultural market, which is
considered one of the most closed among members of the Organization for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD).10  Many of these issues arose during the
KORUS FTA negotiations.
The intensity of these disputes has diminished considerably since the late 1980s
and early 1990s, in part because South Korea enacted a set of sweeping market-
oriented reforms as a quid pro quo for receiving a U.S.-led $58 billion package from
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) following the near collapse of the South
Korean economy in 1997.  In particular, as a result of the reforms, South Korea
opened its doors to foreign investors, ushering in billions of dollars of foreign
portfolio and foreign direct investment (FDI).  The result is that foreign companies,
including U.S. firms, now are significant shareholders in many prominent industrial
conglomerates (chaebol); at one point earlier in the decade, foreign firms owned
about one-third of the South Korean banking industry and an estimated 40% of the
value of the shares traded on South Korea’s stock exchange.  Since the 1997 crisis,
FDI commitments by U.S. companies have totaled over $25 billion.11
Additionally, the United States and South Korea appear to have become more
adept at managing their trade disputes.  This may be partly due to the quarterly,
working-level “trade action agenda” trade meetings that were initiated in early 2001.
Both sides credit the meetings, which appear to be unique to the U.S.-South Korean
trade relationship, with creating a more constructive dialogue that helped pave the
way for the two sides to feel sufficiently confident to launch FTA negotiations.
U.S. and South Korean Objectives in An FTA 
U.S. and South Korean policymakers shared certain goals in launching and
completing the negotiations on the KORUS FTA.  Both governments saw in the FTA
a logical extension of an already important economic relationship that would provide
a means by which the two trading partners could address and resolve fundamental
issues and, thereby, raise the relationship to a higher level.  For the United States
these issues have included the high tariffs and other restrictions on agricultural
imports.  For South Korea, these difficult issues have included perceived U.S.
discrimination toward South Korean imports in the application of trade remedies and
treatment of products made at the Kaesong Industrial Complex in North Korea.
While sharing some broad objectives, U.S. and South Korean leaders also
approached the KORUS FTA from different perspectives that were reflected in the
conduct and outcome of the negotiations.  A primary objective of the United States
was to gain access to South Korean markets in agricultural products, pharmaceuticals
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and medical equipment, some other high-technology manufactured goods, and
services, particularly financial and professional services – areas in which U.S.
producers are internationally competitive but for which South Korean barriers
seemed to be high.
For South Korea gaining a large increase in market access was not as critical a
priority since South Korean exporters already have a significant presence in areas in
which they have proved to be competitive--consumer electronics and autos, for
example, and in which they already face only low or zero U.S. tariffs.  However,
South Korea arguably did seek  to preserve its share of the U.S. market the face of
growing competition from emerging East Asian producers from Thailand, Malaysia,
Vietnam, and possibly China.  South Korea likely also aimed to improve its
competitive position in the U.S. market vis-a-vis Japan where the elimination of even
low tariffs might give South Korean exporters some price advantage.
Launching the FTA negotiations was largely at the initiative of South Korea.
Its main objective in securing an FTA with the United States was much broader than
gaining reciprocal access to the U.S. market.  Entering an FTA with the United States
meshed with a number of South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun’s long term
economic and strategic goals.  Roh  made an FTA the top economic priority for the
remainder of his tenure, which expires in February 2008.12  Soon after his election
in 2002, Roh committed himself to raising South Korea’s per capita gross domestic
product (GDP) to $20,000 by the end of the decade and to transforming South Korea
into a major “economic hub” in Northeast Asia by expanding the economic reforms
begun by his predecessor following the 1997 Asian financial crisis.  Ongoing
competitive pressure from Japanese firms, increased competition from Chinese
enterprises, and the rapid ageing of the South Korean workforce has heightened the
sense of urgency about boosting national competitiveness. Continuing along this line
of argument, South Korean Prime Minister Han Duk-soo has said that a failure to
adopt significant economic changes will mean that “Korea’s long term growth
potential is likely to deteriorate.”13  Lee Myung-bek, who was elected President in
December 2007, made the economy the centerpiece of his campaign and has
supported the KORUS FTA as part of a larger program to promote South Korean
economic growth.
During the negotiations, South Korean officials and other South Korean
proponents of the KORUS FTA tended not to focus on the increased access to the
U.S. market. Rather, they emphasized the medium and long-term gains that would
stem from increased allocative efficiency of the South Korean economy, particularly
in the services industries.  This would presumably be brought about by an influx of
U.S. investment and technology into South Korea and by the spur of increased
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competition with U.S. firms.14  The President and other senior officials in particular
emphasized the need to boost the competitiveness of South Korean service industries.
An FTA with the United States, they argued, will help address South Korea’s
increased economic polarization by spurring job creation in fields such as medical,
legal, education, and accounting services in a free trade agreement.15  Some, however,
say an FTA will worsen South Korea’s income gap.16Also, during the talks, there
were continuous and often large scale anti-FTA protests particularly by South Korean
farmers and trade unionists.
The absence of mirror-image or reciprocal U.S. and South Korean objectives in
the negotiations is reflected in the structure of the KORUS FTA.  Except for some
provisions dealing with issues specific to U.S.-South Korea economic relations, for
example, South Korea taxation of autos and the Kaesong industrial complex, the
structure of the KORUS FTA largely resembles the structure  of other FTAs, such as
Dominican Republic-Central American FTA (DR-CAFTA), that the United States
has entered into.  This conclusion does not suggest that South Korea did not bring to
the table its own specific demands, which it did (such as the exclusion of rice) and
held to them firmly.
Sector-Specific Issues and the KORUS FTA
Under the KORUS FTA, U.S. and South Korean negotiators addressed a
number of sector-specific issues.  Some issues, such as elimination of tariffs on most
manufactured goods, were not very controversial and were dealt with in early stages
of the negotiations.  Other issues, such as trade in agricultural products and in autos,
were the most difficult and were not resolved until the final hours of the negotiations.
Agriculture and Sanitary and Phytosanitary Issues
Overview.  Attaining comprehensive market access for U.S. agricultural
products to South Korea's large market and finding a way to resolve Korea's
continued restrictions on U.S. beef purchases (imposed to protect human health
following the late 2003 discovery of mad cow disease in the U.S. cattle herd)  were
the two primary objectives pursued by U.S. agricultural negotiators.  Though South
Korea in 2006 was the 14th largest agricultural importer in the world, its farm sector
is highly protected with high tariffs and quotas.17  This reflects its farmers'
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longstanding political influence (particularly rice producers) and its urban
population's deep ties to its rural roots.
In concluding the KORUS FTA, the United States secured nearly complete
access for all U.S. agricultural commodities and food products into Korea's market.
However, there was no breakthrough on the beef issue (technically not part of the
FTA talks but nevertheless elevated to high-level discussions).  This issue is still
being negotiated (see below).  Several Members of Congress have stated that South
Korea must agree to fully reopen its market to U.S. beef under scientifically-based
international rules in commercially significant quantities before Congress considers
or approves the agreement.  U.S. agricultural groups, well aware of this deal's
potential benefits for producers, have conditioned their support on the resumption of
U.S. beef exports.  With the White House recognizing the importance of securing the
support of farm state members in order to offset the opposition of Members from
auto manufacturing areas, President Bush is not expected to send the agreement to
Capitol Hill until the issue of beef sales is resolved.
In 2006, South Korea was the 6th largest market for U.S. agriculture, as export
sales totaled almost $2.9 billion.  Under the KORUS FTA's agricultural provisions,
South Korea immediately would grant duty-free status to almost two-thirds of current
U.S. agricultural exports.  Tariffs and tariff-rate quotas (TRQs)18 on most other
agricultural goods would be phased out within 10 years, with the remaining
commodities and products subject to provisions that phase out such protection by
year 23.  Seven U.S. products (skim and whole milk powders, evaporated milk,
in-season oranges, potatoes for table use, honey, and identity-preserved soybeans for
food use) would be subject to import quotas that slowly expand in perpetuity.
However, the agreement does not give U.S. rice and rice products additional access
to South Korea's market (see below).19
With the immediate elimination or phase out of most of South Korea's relatively
high agricultural trade barriers under the KORUS FTA, the U.S. agricultural and food
processing sectors would noticeably benefit from additional exports.  The USITC
estimates that the increase in U.S. exports of agricultural commodities and processed
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 In 2003, U.S. exports of beef muscle meats to South Korea totaled 213,083 MT.  The
safeguard level in year 1 would allow for duty-free access for about 20% more U.S. beef
than the average 2002-2003 level of U.S. beef exports to the South Korean market.
foods would account for up to one-third of the entire projected increase in total U.S.
exports to South Korea's market once the KORUS FTA's provisions are fully
implemented.  Sale of agricultural products would be from $1.9 billion to $3.8 billion
(44% to 89%) higher in 2008 than exports under a no-agreement scenario.  Almost
half of this export increase would accrue to the U.S. beef sector, based on the
USITC's assumption that U.S. beef exports recover to the level before South Korea
imposed its restrictions import in late 2003.  (For information on South Korea’s
restrictions on imports of U.S. beef and bilateral efforts to negotiate new Korean
rules for U.S. beef imports, see Appendix A.)  About 20% of the export increase
would benefit U.S. producers and exporters of pork, poultry and other meat
products.20  In another analysis, the American Farm Bureau Federation (AFBF)
projects that U.S. agricultural exports by the end of the transition period (2027)
would be more than $1.5 billion (45%) higher under the KORUS FTA than would
be the case otherwise.  Sales of beef, poultry, and pork would account for $644
million (or 42%) of this increase.21
Because South Korean agricultural exports to the United States are small ($217
million in 2006) and largely complementary, there was no controversy in negotiating
access to the U.S. market.  The United States agreed to phase out tariffs and quotas
on all agricultural imports from South Korea under seven phase-out periods ranging
up to 15 years. One 10-year TRQ would apply to imports of fluid milk and cream,
among other specified dairy products.  The USITC projects that imports of
agricultural products (primarily processed food products) from South Korea under
the KORUS FTA would be from $52 million to $78 million (12% to 18%) higher
than such imports under a no-agreement scenario.
Beef.  Under the KORUS FTA, South Korea agreed to eliminate its 40% tariff
on beef muscle meats imported from the United States over a 15 year period.  Also,
South Korea would have the right to impose safeguard tariffs on a temporary basis
in response to any potential surge in imports of U.S. beef meats above specified
levels.  The trigger for this additional tariff would be 270,000 metric tons [MT] in
year 1, which would increase 2% annually; in year 15, the trigger would be 354,000
MT.22  In year 16, this protective mechanism would no longer apply.  The 18% tariff
on imports of beef offals (tongues, livers, tails and feet), and tariffs ranging from
22.5% to 72% on other beef products, would be similarly eliminated in 15 years.
However, the timing of and the extent to which U.S. exporters could begin to benefit
from these planned tariff reductions would depend on the outcome of continued talks
on the human health rules that South Korea applies to U.S. beef shipments.
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Assuming that South Korea fully lifts its restrictions on U.S. beef and bilateral
beef trade returns to normal, the USITC estimates that the phase out of South Korea's
beef tariff and safeguard could increase U.S. beef exports from about $600 million
to almost $1.8 billion (58% to165%) above what would be the case otherwise.  Under
the KORUS FTA, the AFBF projects that U.S. beef sales would be $265 million
higher as the United States recaptures its historic share of the South Korean market.
However, its analysis notes that the market share of U.S. beef likely will not increase
over time.  That is because South Korean tastes have developed a preference for
grass-fed Australian beef, which will continue to be competitive in price against U.S.
beef even with the 40% tariff now imposed.
Rice.  South Korean negotiators succeeded in excluding the entry of U.S. rice
on preferential terms – its prime objective in negotiating agriculture in the KORUS
FTA.  This reflects Korea's efforts to maintain its stated policy of self sufficiency in
rice production, the national sentiment that preserving rice production is inseparable
from the country's national identity, and the political reality that rice farming
preserves the basis for economic activity in the countryside.  That rice was a make-
or-break issue for Seoul is seen in the comment made by a top U.S. trade official,
Deputy United States Trade Representative Karan Bhatia, the day after the talks
concluded:  “Ultimately, the question that confronted us was whether to accept a
very, very good albeit less perfect agreement or to lose the entire agreement because
South Korea refused to move on rice.”23  On rice, the KORUS FTA only requires
South Korea to continue to abide by its multilateral trade commitments to increase
rice imports.
At present, U.S. rice exporters have access to the South Korean market under
(1) a 24% share (50,076 MT) of the rice import quota established under that country's
multilateral World Trade Organization (WTO) commitments in 1995, and (2) a
separate quota available to all countries.24  Rice entering under both quotas faces a
5% tariff.  Entries above each quota are prohibited – a unique concession that South
Korea received in the last round of multilateral trade negotiations.  U.S. rice exports
against both quotas have varied from year to year, ranging from less than $1 million
in 2000 (1,572 MT) to $32 million in 2006 (66,026 MT).  Future U.S. sales are
expected to grow slowly in line with the expansion of the most recently established
rice quota.
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Though the U.S. rice industry expressed disappointment with the rice exclusion,
the United States will have other opportunities in the future to negotiate access for
additional U.S. rice in Korea's market.  This could occur in the process of concluding
a multilateral agreement (possibly by 2009) to further liberalize agricultural trade in
the WTO's Doha Development Round, which might require South Korea to further
open its rice market.  Also, the United States and other rice exporting countries could
press for additional access when Korea's current multilateral rice access provisions
expire in 2014.
Oranges.  Differences on how quickly to liberalize trade in fresh oranges were
not resolved until just before the negotiations concluded.  The United States sought
the complete elimination of Korea's border protection on all citrus products, while
South Korea wanted to retain its quotas and tariffs, primarily because of the
importance of the citrus industry to the economy of Cheju Island.  At present, South
Korea imposes a 50% tariff on all imports of oranges, irrespective of whether they
enter within or outside an existing TRQ.
In reaching a compromise, negotiators agreed to a multi-part solution.  First, a
small duty-free quota would be created for "in-season" U.S. navel oranges (a variety
that is not produced in Korea) that enter between September 1 and the end of
February – a period that coincides with the Island's unshu (mandarin) orange harvest
season.  The initial 2,500 MT TRQ would increase at a compound 3% annual rate in
perpetuity.  Shipments in excess of this amount during this six-month period would
continue to be subject to the 50% tariff.  Second, in the first year, this high tariff
would be immediately reduced to 30% for "out-of-season" oranges that enter between
March 1 and August 31, and then be completely phased out by year 7.  Third, South
Korea's 144% tariff on mandarin oranges would be phased out over 15 years.
The cost of selling to what already is a leading U.S. export market for fresh
oranges and tangerines will be significantly reduced as Korea's high 50% tariff is
phased out.  In 2006, South Korea ranked third, with U.S. sales totaling $61 million
(75,550 MT).  USDA estimates that the value of the in-season 2,500 MT quota and
tariff reductions in the first year would be almost $20 million. Over seven years,
USDA estimates the cumulative value of savings associated with the elimination of
the 50% tariff on out-of season oranges to be $237 million.25
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Provisions.  As found in most other U.S.
FTAs, the KORUS FTA establishes a bilateral standing committee to address food
safety and animal/plant life or health issues that frequently emerge in agricultural
trade.  However, there are no commodity-specific sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS)
provisions to address outstanding issues, such as the fallout of BSE on U.S. beef
sales to South Korea.  The Committee on SPS Matters would serve as a forum to
implement the WTO's Agreement on the Application of SPS Measures, enhance
mutual understanding of each country's SPS rules, resolve future bilateral SPS
disputes that arise, coordinate technical assistance programs, and consult on issues
and positions in the WTO and other international bodies where SPS issues are
CRS-15
26
 This stance is reflected in testimony by the National Cattlemen's Beef Association before
the USITC on June 20, 2007.
27
 U.S. Dept. of Commerce. International Trade Administration. Office of Aerospace and
Automotive Industries. U.S. International Trade Data for Road Motor Vehicles series. Data
for 1990 and 2000 quoted from CRS Report RL32883, Appendix 5.
considered.  The text of the SPS chapter specifically states that neither the United
States nor South Korea has recourse to pursue dispute settlement to address any SPS
issue that arises.  Instead, any matter would be resolved using the formal process
established under the WTO's SPS Agreement.
U.S. beef producers' are concerned that Korea's current stance on U.S. beef
imports must be scientifically based upon internationally recognized guidelines
issued by the World Organization for Animal Health.26  Other agricultural groups
also have raised concerns about Korea's implementation of SPS measures on food
additives and those that have restricted U.S. fruit and vegetable exports.  This new
standing committee potentially could be used as the venue to attempt to resolve
future SPS disputes, taking into account latest available scientific findings and
knowledge.
Autos
The export orientation of the South Korean motor industry, combined with the
relatively low U.S. tariff of 2.5% on all imported motor vehicles except pickup
trucks, has made the United States a good market of opportunity for South Korean
exports. (For a discussion of the South Korean auto industry, see Appendix B)  Total
Korean motor vehicle exports to the United States peaked at 860,000 units in 2004,
according to U.S. Commerce Department data.  It subsequently fell to 730,000 units
in 2005, and 695,000 units in 2006.  Hyundai has established a major U.S. assembly
plant, thus substituting for some imports (Kia also plans to open a U.S. assembly
plant by 2010).  Also, imports from Korea probably were affected by a general
softening of the U.S. market.  By contrast, U.S. exporters, including South Korean
and other foreign-owned manufacturers, shipped a total of just 8,707 vehicles to
South Korea in 2006.  The total value of South Korean automotive exports to the
United States, including parts, was $12.4 billion in 2006, compared to U.S. exports
of similar products to South Korea of $720 million.  That meant a U.S. bilateral
deficit in autos of $11.7 billion, growing from a deficit of $5.5 billion in 2000, and
$1.5 billion in 1990.27
South Korean policies that allegedly restrict imports of foreign-made motor
vehicles have been a major target of U.S. trade policy.  In 1995 and 1998, the USTR
negotiated memoranda of understanding (MOUs) with South Korea, aimed at
reducing formal and informal South Korean policies that were said to discriminate
against imports of U.S.-made vehicles, and other foreign imports.  U.S. policy
primarily focused on motor vehicle taxation policies and South Korean motor vehicle
standards, which supposedly did not conform to international standards, or those
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widely used in major markets.28  The import share of the domestic market in South
Korea has increased since the MOUs were signed – according to data calculated by
CRS from standard industry sources cited above, total imports grew from a low of
less than 1% of the market (5,000 units) in 2000 to a 3% market share by 2005.29  But
such a rate of progress has evidently been too slow for both the U.S. government and
the domestically owned motor vehicle industry.
Automotive Trade Provisions in KORUS FTA.  The Office of the USTR
states that KORUS FTA, “Includes a broad and unprecedented range of focused
provisions designed to open up Korea’s auto market to U.S. cars and ensure that U.S.
automakers have a fair opportunity to compete in Korea.”30  These provisions may
be summarized as follows:
! Elimination of most South Korean tariffs on U.S.-made motor
vehicles.  “Korea would immediately eliminate its 8% tariff on U.S.-
built passenger cars and its 10% tariff on pickup trucks,”31 Tariffs
would be immediately reduced to zero in each country for autoparts
imported from the other.32
! Reduction of alleged discriminatory effects of engine displacement
taxes.  A major U.S. complaint has been that South Korea has a
steeply ascending vehicle tax schedule, with very high rates on
vehicles with larger engine capacities, such as might be exported by
U.S. producers.  Moreover, the tax system has a “cascade” effect, so
that subsequent taxation rates incorporate, for example, the 8% duty
paid on an imported vehicle.  According to the U.S. International
Trade Commission (USITC) report on the agreement, 76% of the
South Korean market is in vehicles with engine displacement less
than 2000 cc, with 54% in the range 1601-2000 cc.33  Currently, the
consumer pays a “Special Consumption Tax” on purchase of a
vehicle: cars below 800 cc are exempt, cars in the next range up to
2000 cc pay 5%, anything larger is charged 10%.  After an interim
reduction period of three years, South Korea under the FTA would
simplify this to a two-tier system: under 1000 cc tax-free, anything
larger would be taxed at 5%.  Besides this purchase tax, owners must
pay an “Annual Vehicle Tax,” also based on engine displacement.
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Currently, there are five different ranges in this system, and the
owner of a vehicle with an engine larger than the 1600-2000 cc
market “sweet spot” pays an extra 10% per cc ownership tax.  South
Korea has agreed to simplify the ranges to three: 80 won/cc below
1000 cc engine capacity, 140 won/cc up to 1600 cc, and 200 won/cc
for anything larger.34  Both of these changes would include the
majority of domestically produced cars, as well as imports, in the
highest tax bracket.
! Standards harmonization and creation of an“Automotive Working
Group.”  U.S. manufacturers have complained that South Korea sets
safety regulations and automotive product standards in a manner that
is closed to outsiders and not transparent, and that consequently
results in standards idiosyncratic to Korea.  South Korean-based
producers, who hold the lion’s share of the domestic market, can
afford to operate one line for domestic production, and another for
export.  Foreign companies have difficulty affording the high unit
cost of customizing a small number of vehicles for the South Korean
market.35  This problem is addressed in the KORUS FTA (Chapter
9– “Technical Barriers to Trade”) and in an exchange of
“confirmation letters” of June 30, 2007 between USTR Susan
Schwab and South Korean Trade Minister Hyun Chung Kim.
Essentially, the agreement provides for self-certification on safety
and emissions standards for a limited number of U.S.-exported
vehicles, and a commitment that South Korea will evaluate
emissions using “the methodology applied by the State of California
...”
36
  South Korea also agreed “not to adopt technical regulations
that create unnecessary barriers to trade and to cooperate to
harmonize standards.”37  Under terms of Annex 9-B, the two parties
agree to create an “Automotive Working Group,” which will meet
at least annually, and will review and resolve “issues with respect to
developing, implementing and enforcing relevant standards,
technical regulations and conformity assessment procedures.”38
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! Elimination of U.S. tariffs and “snapback” clause.  The major
commitment on the U.S. side with respect to automotive trade issues
is the elimination of all tariffs on South Korean-produced motor
vehicles.  The United States would immediately eliminate its 2.5%
duty on gasoline-fueled passenger vehicles with engine displacement
up to 3000 cc.  It would also phase out the same rate of duty on
South Korean imports with larger engine capacity or that are diesel-
powered over three years.  The 25% duty on pickup trucks, a
residual rate dating from an earlier trade dispute with Europe, would
be phased out on South Korean products over ten years.39  However,
the FTA, in Annex 22-A, also establishes a special bilateral dispute
settlement panel, designed to resolve automotive issues within six
months.  “If panel finds a violation of an auto-related commitment
or the nullification/impairment of expected benefits, the complaining
Party may suspend its tariff concessions on passenger cars and assess
duties at the prevailing MFN rate (i.e., ‘snap-back’ any tariff
reductions provided by the FTA).”40  The USITC notes in its report
that, “The dispute settlement provisions restrict the [U.S.] snapback
penalty on light trucks ... to the rate for passenger cars, 2.5%,” while
South Korea could snap back to 8%.41
Expected Impact and Industry Reaction.  The USITC simulation model
of the KORUS FTA estimates that while U.S. automotive exports to Korea would
increase by a range of 45% to 59%, this would only amount to about $300-400
million because of the low current baseline.42  It states that tariff elimination “would
likely have a positive effect on U.S. exports ... further, the overall tax burden on the
South Korean consumer who purchases an imported vehicle would be reduced, more
or less equalizing the total taxes paid on imported and domestic vehicles.”43  It
particularly emphasizes the potential gain for U.S.-exported hybrid vehicles to Korea,
though failing to note that most hybrids in the U.S. market today are imported from
Japan.44  However, as the Detroit-based U.S. manufacturers have plans to increase
their hybrid fleets and there are no South Korean-produced hybrid vehicles at present,
the U.S. manufacturers could have a head start on these products (assuming
Japanese-owned companies in the United States do not also export hybrids from their
incipient U.S. production to the South Korean market). 
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With respect to automotive imports from South Korea into the United States,
the USITC simulation estimates an “increase by $1.3-1.7 billion (9-12%).”  However,
it also finds that “approximately 55-57% [would be] represented by diverted imports
from other trade partners.”45  Jeffery Schott states that South Korea gave a “priority
to eliminating the small U.S. tariff” primarily because of Japanese competition.
Since 2001, the won has strengthened against the U.S. dollar, while the Japanese yen
has weakened, creating a disadvantage in the U.S. market for Hyundai, whose
vehicles must compete against Japanese companies’ vehicles on price.  One result
has been reported significant declines in Hyundai earnings.46  The USITC also notes
plans by Hyundai to begin producing vehicles based on hybrid technology,
indications that Hyundai and Kia were studying the development of pickup trucks,
and actual exports of a small number of pickups to third markets by Ssangyong, a
smaller producer.47  Hyundai and Kia do already produce small pickup-type vehicles
in Korea, but they would not appear to be suitable in design or style for the United
States.48
U.S. industrial interests’ views on KORUS FTA may be described as follows:
! The Detroit “Big Three” are split.  Ford and Chrysler are opposed,
while General Motors (GM) is neutral. 
! Automotive parts suppliers were reported to support the FTA. 
! Broader-based industry organizations are favorable, despite the
opposition of two major motor manufacturers and some other
sectoral groups.
These views were reflected in the April 2007 report of the Industry Trade
Advisory Committee on Automotive and Capital Goods (ITAC 2) to USTR of April
2007.  The chair noted that, “Generally, the manufacturers of capital goods see  [the
FTA] as an important milestone in providing market access to a country and region
historically protectionist ... However, in terms of U.S. automotive equipment
manufacturers, the outcome is mixed.”49
Both the U.S. motor vehicle industry representatives and the whole of ITAC 2
initially recommended an “unconventional” approach on automotive issues in the
negotiations.  It would have “precondion[ed] the phase-out of U.S. automotive tariffs
on the demonstration of South Korean market openness in terms of improved import
penetration that is on par with that of other OECD countries.”
Fifteen Members of Congress, including Representative Charles Rangel, chair
of the House Ways and Means Committee, wrote President Bush on March 2, 2007,
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with a proposal along the lines of the “performance metric” approach suggested by
ITAC 2.  Their proposal would have delayed full elimination of the U.S. import tariff
cut for at least 15 years, while U.S. representatives assessed South Korea’s
performance in opening its market to U.S. exports. A formula would be used each
year to determine the number of South Korean-produced vehicles that would receive
duty-free treatment in return.  They also proposed a “snapback” safeguard provision
on the U.S. tariff should South Korean imports in the U.S. market be judged to
increase too rapidly.  The 25% U.S. tariff on pickup trucks would remain in place,
subject to a multilateral agreement on automotive trade at the World Trade
Organization.50
Despite the fact that the final agreement did “not include a performance metric
approach,” most ITAC 2 members supported KORUS FTA anyway.51  The Ford
Motor Company disagreed.  In its statement appended to the report, Ford accepted
that “some progress was achieved with respect to existing non-tariff barriers
(NTBs).”  But it noted that many of the exemptions for U.S.-made vehicles with
respect to NTBs were very limited in volume or were temporary, that South Korea
could continue to use a mix of U.S. and European standards, and that taxation rates
were still exceptionally high for the types of product foreign companies would most
likely export to South Korea.  On the other hand, the immediate lifting of the U.S.
2.5% tariff on most South Korean imports would be a “lopsided benefit” that in
effect “will reward South Korean manufacturers for 20 years of unfair trade practices
by the South Korean Government.”52
By contrast, a GM statement appended to the ITAC-2 report concluded that the
proposed FTA “has addressed the auto industry’s concerns.”  But “given the current
imbalance in trade between the two countries,” GM foresaw that in the “near term”
South Korea would be the greater beneficiary, and therefore GM would be  neutral
on the agreement.  It noted that tax policy changes promised by the South Korean
government would reduce the overall burden on the automotive sector and that there
were no caps on U.S.-exported vehicles meeting compliance with California emission
standards, because South Korea committed to establish emission requirements on the
same basis.  GM also commented that the sector-specific “snapback” rule on tariff
reductions was a unique and positive addition to U.S. FTAs.53  It should be added that
GM’s position is probably influenced by the fact that it has become a major investor
in the South Korean motor industry through its acquisition of Daewoo.  In 2006, GM
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sold 58,000 Chevrolet Aveos in the United States that were imported from its South
Korean affiliate.54
The United Auto Workers (UAW) union is strongly opposed to the FTA, and
its literature on the subject includes a joint statement of opposition issued together
with the South Korean Metal Workers’ Union (KMWU).55  In testimony before the
House Ways and Means Committee’s Trade Subcommittee, UAW Legislative
Director Alan Reuther endorsed the negotiating strategy proposed by Members of
Congress, described above.56  He stated that the final agreement as contemplated
instead “would exacerbate the totally one-sided auto trade imbalance between South
Korea and the U.S. and jeopardize the jobs of tens of thousands of American
workers.”57  Reuther further criticized the labor rights record of South Korea as “very
problematic.”  He noted “numerous areas of worker rights violations in South
Korea,” cited in the U.S. Department of State’s 2005 Country Reports on Human
Rights Practices and the arrest of the KMWU president in 2006 in a protest against
government efforts to change South Korean labor laws in a manner unfavorable to
the union movement there.58
Both the management side and the labor side of the domestically owned U.S.
automotive industry have used the word “unbalanced” to describe the benefits that
may flow from the implementation of KORUS FTA.  This may seem odd, given that
the agreement has many provisions in various chapters dealing with specific South
Korean policies and practices, and virtually none on the U.S. side, beyond the
elimination of tariffs.  This could be because the global competitive problems
currently affecting the unionized, domestically owned sector of the U.S. motor
vehicle industry go well beyond the scope of this FTA to solve.59  Indeed, given
major differences in the profiles of the U.S. and South Korean motor vehicle markets,
it would appear unlikely that the Detroit Big Three, which tend to specialize
domestically in the production of larger vehicles, could ever gain more than a
fractional position there through exports from the United States.  Thus, the UAW,
Ford, and Chrysler oppose KORUS FTA as potentially only adding to the severe
competitive pressure their side of the domestic U.S. industry is facing.  GM has
secured a solid investment position in South Korea that it is integrating into its global
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strategy.  But possibly it may not want to antagonize its unionized U.S. employees,
and has taken a neutral position.
Textiles and Apparel
Textiles and apparel are a small and dwindling portion of U.S. imports from
South Korea.  In 2006, textiles accounted for 2.2% of total U.S. imports from South
Korea and apparel accounted for 1.2%.  In 2006, the United States imported $1.0
billion in apparel and $0.6 billion in textiles from South Korea.  South Korea’s shares
of the U.S. market for textiles and apparel has shrunk in relative and absolute terms
over the years.  In 1991, for example, South Korea was the fourth largest source of
U.S. imports of apparel with an 8.0% share, but by 2006, it had dropped to the 23rd
largest source with a 1.2% share.  This decrease came largely as the result of the surge
in China’s share of U.S. apparel imports, which grew from 15.1% in 1991, to 29.4%
in 2006.  South Korea’s share of U.S. imports of textiles has held relatively steady.
In 1991, South Korea was the 3rd largest source of U.S. textile imports with 8.4%but
had dropped to the 4th largest source with 8.0% by 2006.60  The United States exports
small volumes of textiles and apparel to South Korea–$56.1 million of apparel and
$231.4 million of textiles in 2006.61
KORUS FTA would eliminate U.S. tariffs immediately on 52% (in terms of
value) U.S. imports of South Korean textiles and apparel, and would phase out U.S.
tariffs on 21% over five years and on the remaining 27% over 10 years.62  Currently,
the average U.S. MFN tariff on textiles is 7.9% with a maximum applied tariff of
34.0% and with 16.1% of textiles categories already entering the United States duty
free.  The average applied U.S. MFN tariff on apparel imports is 11.5% with a
maximum tariff of 32%, and 3.3% of the tariff lines entering duty free.63
The average South Korean applied tariff on textiles is 9.2% with a maximum of
13% and 0.3% of tariff lines entering duty free.  The average South Korean  tariff on
apparel is 12.6% with none entering duty free and with a maximum tariff of 13%.64
The KORUS FTA, would eliminate South Korean tariffs immediately on 77% (by
value) of U.S. exports of textiles and apparel and would phase out tariffs on 13% over
three years and the remaining 10% over five years.65
The KORUS FTA, with some exceptions, would use the yarn-forward rule of
origin for apparel imports; that is, apparel made from yarn or fabric originating in
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either the United States or South Korea would be eligible for duty-free treatment
under the FTA.  The FTA also includes a special safeguard provision whereby,  if
imports of textiles or wearing apparel to one KORUS FTA partner country from the
other increases at such a rate as to cause or threaten to cause serious injury to the
domestic industry of the importing country, the importing country can suspend further
reduction of tariffs, or it can increase the duty on the imported product to (the lesser
of) the MFN rate applicable at the time the action was taken or the MFN duty that was
in force when the FTA went into effect.  The safeguard action can be in place for two
years with a possible extension of two years but no more than a total of four years.
However, the importing country will have to compensate the exporting country  by
making additional trade liberalizing concessions equivalent in value to the additional
duties expected to result from the safeguard action.  The concessions would be limited
to textiles and apparel unless the two countries agree otherwise.
The USITC has estimated that, if implemented, the KORUS FTA would over
time lead to an increase in U.S. imports of South Korean textiles  of $1.7  billion
to$1.8 billion and of apparel of $1.0 billion to $1.2 billion, with the major portion of
the increase being diverted from other countries.  The USITC also has estimated that
KORUS FTA would lead to an increase in U.S. exports of textiles of $130 million to
$140 million and of apparel of $39 million to $45 million to South Korea.66
The KORUS FTA would allow some  fibers, yarns, and fabrics originating out
side of the United States and  South Korea to become eligible for preferential
treatment  if the product is not available domestically in commercial quantities in
either country.  The agreement also provides for the establishment of a Committee on
Textile and Apparel Trade Matters to raise concerns under the FTA regarding mutual
trade in these products.
The textile and apparel industry appears split on their views of the KORUS FTA
according to the Industry Trade Advisory Committee on Textiles and Clothing (ITAC-
13).67  Some representatives of the textile producers support the yarn-forward rule as
benefitting their industry and also conforming to provisions in other U.S. FTAs but
also argue that it should be broader by including sewing thread, narrow fabrics and
pocketing fabrics, which are excluded from the rule.  Others, including some textile
representatives and representatives from the apparel industry with supply chains in
other countries, have criticized the yarn-forward rule as being restrictive and limiting
trade opportunities
Members of the industry are also divided on the lack of cumulation provisions
in the FTA, that is provisions which allow preferential treatment for limited amounts
of apparel woven from components outside the FTA area.  Textile producers
supported the lack of cumulation provisions while apparel producers would have
wanted them included.  They also split on the phase-out periods for tariffs with textile
producers arguing that some sensitive products were given immediate duty-free
treatment.  Apparel producers argued that all apparel and textiles should have been
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given immediate duty-free treatment.  Footwear and travel goods are also covered
under the FTA.  Producers of both categories strongly support the FTA and how their
products would be treated.68
Other Manufactured Goods
The provisions of KORUS FTA affect a wide range of other industries beyond
the automotive sector and textiles and apparel.  Cross-sectoral trade associations that
represent broad ranges of U.S. manufacturers have indicated their support for the
agreement, not only because of the general elimination of South Korean tariffs on U.S.
exports, but also because of such provisions as those promising to increase
cooperation in the reduction of technical barriers to trade and the improvement in
South Korea of the protection of U.S. companies’ intellectual property rights.69
Similarly, most sectoral trade associations expressed support, although some noted
reservations with specific provisions.70  The steel industry in particular was a notable
dissenter.
Capital Goods Machinery and Equipment.  U.S. machinery exports could
be the largest single sectoral gainer from the FTA with South Korea.  According to the
US ITC’s simulation analysis, the sector stands to gain nearly $3 billion in exports if
the agreement is approved.71  The tariffs on U.S. machinery and equipment imported
into South Korea range from 3% to 13%, but U.S. products are already competitive
in many cases, and already account for 15-20% of total South Korean imports. (A
specific example is U.S.-made computer-numerically controlled machine tools.)  Most
machinery tariffs would be immediately eliminated; others would be phased out over
three to ten years.72  As noted in the previous section on autos, the capital goods
machinery industry representatives in ITAC 2 split with the motor vehicle industry
representatives and supported the agreement.  The ITAC report specifically cited,
“U.S. manufacturers of electrical equipment [who] will benefit substantially by South
Korean tariff reductions and eliminations, where the sector has already returned to
running a trade surplus with South Korea.”73  The USITC report further noted the
export potential of electrical-power generating equipment, for which South Korean
duties range up to 8% currently. U.S. exporters are nonetheless already leading
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suppliers of turbines, generators and nuclear reactors to South Korea.74  The National
Electrical Manufacturers Association (NEA) stated that U.S. exports to South Korea
had risen steadily, by a total of 62%, since 2002, and that there was a U.S. surplus in
bilateral trade.  It calls for:
... Legislators in both countries to ratify the Agreement as soon as possible.  While
the U.S. electrical equipment industry still has concerns relating to non-tariff
barriers and intellectual property protection in South Korea, the overall FTA
package would improve conditions for selling there by featuring the elimination
– most of it immediate – of remaining tariffs on goods in NEA’s product scope.75
Another major capital goods item in which the United States has a strong
bilateral trade position is aircraft.  Total 2006 aircraft and parts exports to South Korea
were $2.4 billion.  However, civilian aircraft imports are already duty-free in South
Korea.76
Electronic Products and Components.  Both South Korean and U.S.
tariffs on most electronics products, such as semiconductors, telecommunications
equipment, and computers, are already zero, as they are included in the multilateral
Information Technology Agreement eliminating tariffs among more than 50 countries.
The United States already has a substantial surplus with South Korea in
semiconductors: $4.3 billion in 2006 exports, versus $2.9 billion in imports.  The
United States has a small deficit in computer equipment, plus large imports of
computer and office equipment parts and accessories ($2.1 billion) and
communications equipment ($5.6 billion).77
Sectoral organizations representing these industries supported KORUS FTA.  It
was argued the FTA would extend tariff-free treatment to consumer electronics
products and could guarantee improvements for U.S. products in South Korea with
respect to intellectual property protection, technical barriers, government procurement
and competition policy.78
One information technology organization supportive of KORUS FTA, the
Semiconductor Industry Association, did caution that the trade remedies chapter of
KORUS FTA could undermine U.S. industry’s use of antidumping and countervailing
duty (AD-CVD.) laws (see below).  In 2003, the USITC found that Micron
Corporation, the last remaining U.S.-based producer of dynamic random access mode
semiconductors (DRAMs, widely used as memory chips in computers) was materially
injured by government-subsidized DRAM semiconductors produced by Hynix
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Corporation of Korea.  The Commerce Department subsequently established a 44%
penalty tariff on Hynix DRAMs imported into the United States.79
Steel.  The American steel industry registered a strongly negative position on
KORUS FTA through its industry advisory body to USTR, ITAC 12 (Steel).  Its report
noted that the agreement “does not provide for changes in U.S. AD-CVD statutes” and
that each party retains its full rights under World Trade Organization rules.  However,
ITAC 12 objected to “changes to the related legal processes” in the KORUS FTA
chapter on trade remedies with respect to three “key areas:”
! By Article 10.7.3, parties are required to notify each other whenever
an AD-CVD application is filed, and prior to initiation of a formal
investigation.  They must afford the other government an opportunity
to consult on the application.  The steel industry objects to
“improperly politicizing] the consideration of a trade remedy
provision filed by a U.S. industry, in a process that is already
transparent and open,” particularly in antidumping cases.
! In Article 10.4, either party must afford to the other an adequate
opportunity for, and due consideration of price undertakings by
respondent companies, “which, if accepted may result in suspension
of an investigation” without imposition of penalty duties.  The steel
industry is concerned that the provision “would encourage the use of
suspension agreements and the injection of foreign governments into
the trade law process.”
! The steel industry opposes the provision to establish a bilateral
Commission on Trade Remedies (Article 10.8) as “unprecedented,
unnecessary and would provide yet more opportunities for South
Korea to weaken U.S. trade law enforcement.”80
The specific details of the trade remedies chapter are discussed elsewhere in this
report.  Beyond these specific issues ITAC 12 also made a number of other critical
points.  It argued that the rules of origin provisions did not follow earlier precedents
and there were concerns with products eventually being produced in the Kaesong
Industrial Complex of North Korea.  (See the section on the Kaesong Industrial
Complex.)  It objected to the proposed KORUS FTA’s ignoring currency
manipulation issues.  They also supported their U.S. automotive customers’ view that
the FTA failed to insure adequately access to the South Korean market for U.S.-made
motor vehicles.  On these grounds, “especially with regard to the proposed AD-CVD
provisions, ITAC 12 cannot conclude at this time that the KORUS FTA promotes the
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economic interests of the United States and provides for equity and reciprocity within
the steel sector.”81
Pharmaceuticals and Medical Devices
While pharmaceuticals and medical devices (P&M) are a relatively small part of
U.S.-South Korean trade, they are products in which U.S. producers compete well in
the South Korean market and ones in which manufacturers see increasing export
opportunities as the South Korean economy matures.  For years, the U.S. industry and
government have complained about a number of South Korea’s pharmaceutical
policies that allegedly are designed to protect South Korean industry, which
predominately produces generic drugs.
South Korea is among the world’s top 12 largest markets for pharmaceuticals,
accounting for about $8 billion in sales annually.82  The South Korean market for
medical devices accounts for roughly $2.5 billion in sales annually and is expected to
grow 10-15 % each year in the next several years, in part due to the rapid aging of the
population.83 While potentially lucrative, South Korea is a market in which U.S. P&M
manufactures claim government regulations have limited their ability to penetrate that
market.
In 2006, the United States exported $493 million in medical devices to South
Korea, accounting for 2.1% of total U.S. exports of those products and 1.5% of total
U.S. exports to South Korea.  In 2006, the United States exported $325 million in
pharmaceuticals to South Korea accounting for 1.0% of total U.S. exports of
pharmaceuticals and 1.0% of total U.S. exports to South Korea.  In the same year
South Korea exported $214 million in medical devices and $61 million in
pharmaceuticals to the United States.
Of major concern was the South Korean government’s May 2006 change in how
it determined reimbursement amounts.  Prior to the change, it maintained a “negative
list” system, under which products would be eligible for reimbursement unless they
appeared on the list.  With the change, the South Korean government has switched to
a “positive list” requiring a product to be listed before it would be eligible making it
potentially more difficult for a product to become eligible.  Announcement of the
policy came without prior notification to U.S. officials or affected U.S. manufacturers
and occurred at an early point in the negotiations placing a cloud over them.  Despite
complaints from the United States, South Korea went ahead with implementing its
positive list system.
P&M manufacturers also have cited the South Korean government’s policies on
reimbursements for pharmaceuticals and medical devices under its single-payer health
insurance program.  U.S. manufacturers have argued that the policies discriminate
against innovative pharmaceuticals because they establish relatively low
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reimbursement amounts for medicines thus not taking into account the costs that
producers of leading-edge pharmaceuticals incur and that are reflected in higher
prices.  The manufacturers wanted the KORUS FTA to establish transparency as  an
important principal in South Korea’s development and implementation of
reimbursement policies, including an appeal process for decisions going against U.S.
manufacturers.
In response, South Korea agreed in the KORUS FTA to allow U.S.
pharmaceutical makers to apply for increased reimbursement levels based on safety
and efficacy.  South Korea also agreed to publish proposed laws, regulations, and
procedures that apply to the pricing, reimbursement, and regulation of pharmaceuticals
and medical devices in a nationally available publication and to allow time for
comment.  In addition, South Korea agreed to establish a process for U.S.
manufacturers to comment on proposed changes in laws and regulations and for them
to obtain a review of administrative determinations that adversely affect them.
Intellectual property rights protection in South Korea has been a critical issue for
U.S. pharmaceutical manufacturers.  Specifically, the failure of the South Korean
government to protect from competitors proprietary data that manufacturers must
submit for market approval.  In addition, the South Korean government has, in some
cases, approved marketing of some pharmaceuticals before it has determined that the
applicant is the rightful owner of the patent and trademark.84  In part for these reasons,
the USTR has continued to place South Korea on the special 301 “Watch List.”85
In response, under the KORUS FTA’s data exclusivity provisions, South Korea
would not allow a third company, such as a generic drug manufacturer, from
marketing a new pharmaceutical using the safety and efficacy data, supplied by an
original U.S. manufacturer as part of the market approval process, without the
permission of the original U.S. maker for five years from the date of marketing
approval for the original product. In addition, if a third party submits safety or efficacy
information for a product that an FTA partner government had already approved,  the
government is to notify the original patent holder of the identity of the third party and
is to prevent the marketing of the third party’s product on its territory if permission
had not been granted by the original patent holder.  In a side letter, the United States
and South Korea agreed to not invoke the data exclusivity provision until  the FTA
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has been in effect 18 months.  Furthermore, South Korea agreed of  a patent-linkage
system; that is, neither government is to approve the marketing to a generic drug while
the original patent is still in effect.  Another provision, known as patent-term
extension, would require each FTA government to adjust the length of the effective
period for patents on pharmaceuticals to take into account delays incurred in receiving
patent approval and  marketing approval.  The KORUS FTA states that no provision
would prevent either government from taking measures to protect the public health of
its residents from HIV/AID, tuberculosis, malaria, and other epidemics, by ensuring
access to medicines.  The FTA would reaffirm each country’s commitment to the
WTO TRIPS/heath Declaration.
Reactions within the pharmaceutical and medical devices industries were
somewhat split on the KORUS FTA.  Makers of innovative products supported the
provisions that are designed to preserve the rights of patent holders and provisions that
are designed to make the South Korean regulatory, pricing, and reimbursement
process more transparent and open to comments and procedural reviews.  At the same
time, industry representatives remain critical of South Korea’s new reimbursement
procedures and argue that the new system does not take into account the benefits of
innovative drugs that cause drug prices to be higher.  Generic drug manufacturers
argue that the KORUS FTA does not contain provisions guaranteeing the availability
of affordable drugs.86
Financial and Other Services 
South Korea was the seventh largest U.S. market for cross-border trade in
services in 2006.87  U.S. service providers exported $12.4 billion in services to South
Korea.  Among them were South Korea travel to the United States ($2.8 billion) other
transportation, such as freight services ($2.8 billion); royalties and license fees ($2.1
billion); and other private services, such as professional services, business services,
banking, insurance, and other financial services ($3.8 billion).88  However, this
amount probably undervalues the total volume of U.S. sales of services to South
Korea as services are also sold through three other modes of delivery: by U.S.
companies with a long-term presence in South Korea, by U.S. providers to South
Korean residents located temporarily in the United States; and by U.S. providers
temporarily located in South Korea.
In 2006, the United States imported $8.2 billion in services, including other
transportation ($3.2 billion), U.S. travel to South Korea ($1.4 billion), expenditures
by U.S. military ($1.7 billion), and other travel ($1.0 billion).89  This figure does not
include services sold to U.S. residents by South Korean firms through the other modes
of delivery.
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U.S.-South Korean trade in services cuts across several chapters of the KORUS
FTA–Chapter 12 (cross-border trade in services); chapter 13 (financial services); and
Chapter 15 (telecommunications); chapter 11 (foreign investment); among others.  A
major U.S. objective in the KORUS FTA negotiations was to obtain South Korean
commitments to reduce barriers to trade and investment in its services sector,
especially in professional, financial, and telecommunications services.  A South
Korean goal was to get the United States to ease restrictions on the issuance of visas
for South Korean business representatives.  The visa issue–along with South Korea’s
request to be added to the Visa Waiver program–  was addressed in discussions
outside of the KORUS FTA negotiations.  (For more information on the visa waiver
issue, see Appendix C.)
In general the two countries would commit to: 
! provide national treatment and most-favored-nation treatment to the
services imports from each other; 
! promote transparency in the development and implementation of
regulations in services providing timely notice of decisions on
government permission to sell services; 
! prohibit  limits on market access, such as a caps on the number of
service providers, on the total value of services provided, on the total
quantity of services provided, and on the total number of persons that
can be employed by services providers;
! prohibit foreign direct investment requirements, such as export and
local content requirements and employment mandates; and  
! prohibit restrictions on the type of business entity through which a
service provider could provide a service.
U.S. and South Korean negotiators agreed to several concepts under the KORUS
FTA that could apply the agreements provisions to a broad scope of services.  The two
countries agreed to  the “negative list” approach in making commitments in services.
That is, the KORUS FTA is to apply to all types of services unless identified as an
exception in the relevant annexes.  In addition, the commitments are racheted —
when new services emerge in the U.S. or South Korean economies, those services are
automatically covered by the FTA unless identified as an exception;  if either country
unilaterally liberalizes a measure that it had listed as an exemption, it is automatically
covered under the FTA.  Furthermore, if one KORUS FTA partner extends
preferential treatment to service providers from a third country under another FTA,
it is to extend the preferential treatment to its KORUS FTA partner.
The United States sought greater reciprocity in the treatment of professional
services and thereby gain increased access to the South Korean market for U.S.
providers.  The United States and South Korea agreed to form a professional services
working group to develop methods to recognize mutual standards and criteria for the
licensing of professional service providers.  Under the KORUS FTA, South Korea
would allow U.S. law firms to establish representative offices in South Korea no later
than two years after the KORUS FTA entered into force.  South Korea would also
permit U.S. legal representative offices to establish cooperative operations with a
South Korean firm to handle matters pertaining to domestic and foreign legal matters,
and, no later than five years after the agreement’s entry into force, would allow U.S.
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law firms to establish joint ventures with South Korean firms.  However, South Korea
would still reserve the right to restrict the activities of foreign lawyers.
Regarding financial services, under the KORUS FTA, if a domestic provider in
one partner country develops and sells a new financial service in its home market,
providers from the FTA partner country would be able to sell a like service in that
market.  The agreement would allow an FTA partner government to impose
restrictions on the sale of financial services by providers from the other partner
country for prudential reasons, for example, to protect investors, depositors, policy
holders, or persons to whom a fiduciary duty is owed.  The FTA would also permit
either partner government to restrict monetary transfers in order to ensure the
soundness of financial institutions.
The South Korean insurance market is the seventh largest in the world. The
USITC estimates, therefore, that U.S. insurers would be poised to obtain sizeable
gains in a liberalized South Korean services market.90 U.S. insurance companies have
been concerned that the state-owned Korea Post and the cooperative insurance
providers– the National Agricultural Cooperative Federation and the National
Federation of Fisheries Cooperative– are not regulated by the Korean Financial
Supervisory Commission  or by the Financial Supervisory Service, while both private-
sector foreign and domestic providers are so regulated.91  Under the KORUS FTA,
South Korea agreed that those entities would be subject to an independent state
regulator as opposed to being self-regulated.92  In addition, Korea Post would not be
allowed to offer new insurance products.  The two countries would allow a partner
country financial services provider to transfer electronically information from its
territory as necessary in the course of doing business.93  This is a provision that the
U.S. industry highlighted as being particularly important.
In telecommunications services, South Korea would reduce government
restrictions on foreign ownership of South Korean telecommunications companies.
Two years after the KORUS FTA enters into force, U.S. companies would be able to
own up to 100% of voting shares in domestic South Korean telecommunications
companies, and those companies would be able to own up to 100% of a facilities-
based licensee.94  These provisions do not apply to KT Corporation nor to SL Telecom
Co for which a 49% foreign ownership limit would remain.  In addition, each KORUS
FTA partner would ensure that telecommunications providers from the other would
have access to and use of its public telecommunications network for purposes of
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interconnection under non-discriminatory conditions and would guarantee dialing
portability among other conditions.95
Those who represent U.S. services providers have been enthusiastic about the
KORUS FTA and have urged its approval.  In a statement, Robert Vastine, President
of the Coalition of Services Industries claimed:
We commend Ambassador Schwab and the team of negotiators who secured
significant benefits for U.S. services providers in this agreement....  Korea  is a
key market for U.S. service companies, and this is a very high-quality agreement
that merits swift passage by the Congress because it creates new commercial
opportunities that will support new jobs.96
General Provisions
The KORUS FTA text contains a number of provisions that cut across in many
sectors in bilateral trade.  Many of these provisions have become standard fare and
have become part of the template for FTAs in which the United States participates. 
Trade Remedies
Trade remedies, laws and actions designed to provide relief to domestic
industries that have been injured or threatened with injury by imports, are regarded by
many in Congress as an important trade policy tool to mitigate the adverse effects of
lower priced imports on U.S. industries and workers.
The three most commonly used trade remedies are antidumping (AD),
countervailing duty (CVD), and safeguard actions.  Antidumping (19 U.S.C. § 1673
et seq.) actions provide relief from the adverse impact of imports sold at prices shown
to be less than fair market value, and countervailing duty (19 U.S.C. § 1671 et seq.)
actions provide similar relief from goods that have been subsidized by a foreign
government or other public entity.  Safeguard actions (19 U.S.C. § 2251 et seq.) are
designed to give domestic industries an opportunity to adjust to new competition and
are triggered by import surges of fairly traded goods.  The relief provided in a
safeguard case is a temporary import duty, temporary import quota, or a combination
of both, while the relief in an antidumping or countervailing duty action is an
additional duty placed on the dumped or subsidized imports.  These actions are
authorized by the WTO as long as they are consistent with the rights and obligations
of Article XIX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1994, the
WTO Agreement on Safeguards and Countervailing Measures (Subsidies Agreement),
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and the WTO Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the GATT 1994
(Antidumping Agreement).97
Many Members of Congress have expressed support for maintaining and
strengthening U.S. trade remedy laws in the face of growing import competition.  As
a result, the preservation of U.S. authority to “enforce rigorously its trade laws” was
a principal negotiating objective included in presidential Trade Promotion Authority
(TPA) in the 107th Congress.98
According to news  reports, the “single most important South Korean demand”
in the bilateral talks was changes to U.S. antidumping rules..99  This may be due, in
part, to the significant  number of U.S. trade remedy cases brought by U.S. industries
on South Korean goods. As of July 15, 2007, antidumping duties were being collected
on 15 South Korean imports (mostly on stainless steel specialty products such wire
rod and pipe fittings), and countervailing duties were being assessed on 5 South
Korean products, while South Korea had 2 antidumping measures in place against
U.S. products.100  The U.S. global safeguard cases imposed on steel in February 2000
(line pipe) and March 2002 (many steel products) also significantly reduced South
Korean steel imports to the United States.101  Of the 13 WTO dispute resolution
complainant cases South Korea has brought to date, seven have been disputes against
U.S. trade remedy actions.102  South Korea is also a member “Friends of
Antidumping” group in the WTO Doha Round that insists on implementing changes
to the Antidumping and Subsidies Agreements in any new multilateral agreement.
In the bilateral negotiations between the United States and South Korea, talks
broke down in early December 2006 when South Korea presented the United States
with a list of specific changes to U.S. antidumping laws on a “basically” take-it-or-
leave-it basis,103 but in mid-January 2007, South Korean officials softened their stance
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after accepting the assurances of U.S. negotiators that Trade Promotion Authority had
granted the Bush Administration only limited flexibility to make concessions on trade
remedy issues.104
The KORUS FTA, just as in earlier FTAs the United States has entered into,
proposes that each party to the agreement would retain all rights and obligations under
the WTO agreements—meaning that the trading partners would be permitted to
include each other in global safeguard actions (although, as in other FTAs, it does
extend a possible exemption from global safeguard measures to either party if its
imports are not a substantial cause of serious injury) and to implement AD and CVD
actions against each other.  Additionally, as in earlier FTAs, the trade remedies article
would also authorize either party to the agreement to apply a transitional safeguard
measure against imports of the other party if, as the result of the reduction or
elimination of a duty mandated by the agreement, a product is being imported in
increased quantities as to be a substantial cause of serious injury to a domestic
industry that produces a like or directly competitive good.105
In the case of a safeguard, the party imposing it must provide a mutually agreed-
upon amount of compensation.  If the parties do not agree, the other party may
suspend concessions on imports of the other party in an amount that has trade effects
substantially equivalent to the safeguard measure.106
As such, the agreement does not seem to require any changes to U.S. AD,CVD,
or global safeguard laws, or substantially change administrative procedures required
to implement these actions.107  However, in an apparent departure from previous
FTAs, the KORUS FTA seems to require a few additional administrative steps prior
to initiation of a trade remedy investigation involving goods from the other party.
First, each party would have to notify the other if an antidumping petition is received
regarding the other party’s imports, as well as provide an opportunity for a meeting
between the parties before an investigation is initiated.108  Additionally, the party
initiating an AD or CVD investigation would be required to provide written
information regarding its procedures for negotiating a price or quantity undertaking
(known in U.S. law as a suspension agreement109), and, after a preliminary affirmative
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determination is reached, “provide due consideration and adequate opportunity for
consultations regarding proposed price undertakings” which could result in suspension
of the investigation without imposition of duties provided a mutually agreeable
undertaking is reached.110
The KORUS FTA would also establish a Committee on Trade Remedies (which
would meet at least once a year) made up of representatives from each party who have
responsibility for trade remedies matters.  Committee functions would include
enhancing knowledge of the parties’ trade remedy laws and practices, overseeing the
implementation of the trade remedies chapter of the agreement, improving cooperation
between the parties, developing educational programs on trade remedy laws, and
providing a forum for exchange of information on trade remedies and other topics of
mutual interest.111
As discussed earlier, the Industry Trade Advisory Committee on Steel (ITAC 12),
believes that the procedural concessions made on trade remedies could politicize trade
remedy actions, thus possibly weakening U.S. trade laws.  In particular, the ITAC 12
stated that the U.S. AD-CVD investigative process is already transparent and that the
pre-initiation notification and consultation requirements would delay and politicize
the process.112  It also objected to the “undertakings” provisions, saying that these
provisions would encourage the use of suspension agreements and introduce actions
of foreign governments into trade remedy procedures.113  (For more information on the
steel industry’s reaction, see discussion in section on “Other Manufactured Goods.”)
The ITAC 12 also opposes the establishment of a Committee on Trade Remedies,
saying that it such a forum would give South Korea an opportunity to attempt to
further try to weaken U.S. trade remedy laws.114 Speaking in April 2007, Assistant
U.S. Trade Representative for Korea, Japan, and APEC Wendy Cutler, the chief U.S.
negotiator, implied that the consultative committee would focus on information
sharing and “will not provide a forum to discuss specific cases.”115  She also
mentioned that the committee could be a benefit to the United States by providing a
platform for discussing certain industrial subsidies that the South Korean government
may be supplying to manufacturing firms, and that negotiators worked out an
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“accommodation” that was beneficial to both sides’ needs on a very contentious part
of the negotiations.116
Kaesong Industrial Complex117
A consistent and significant goal for South Korea in the FTA talks was securing
preferential treatment for products made in the Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC) in
North Korea, a position the United States adamantly throughout most of the
negotiations.  Located near the North Korean city of Kaesong (also spelled
“Gaesong”), 40 miles north of Seoul, the KIC is designed for South Korean companies
to employ North Korean workers.  The factories of 15 South Korean manufacturing
firms began operating when the site opened in 2004.  As of November 2007, this
number had increased to 52 firms, which employed about 20,000 North Korean
workers.  There are plans to expand the zone dramatically.  The South Korean
Unification Ministry expects that by the end of 2010, about 450 South Korean
manufacturers and 100,000 North Korean workers will be in the KIC.118  The KIC
arguably has become the centerpiece for South Korea’s “sunshine policy” of engaging
North Korea.
In the final KORUS FTA agreement, the two sides reached a compromise on the
KIC. One year after the KORUS FTA enters into force, a binational committee will
be formed to study the possibility of eventually including products from “Outward
Processing Zones” (OPZs) using North Korean labor sometime in the future.119  The
agreement identifies three general categories for which the committee is to develop
more detailed criteria: progress in the denuclearization of North Korea, developments
in intra-Korean relations; and wages, the environment, and labor standards.  For the
third category of issues, the committee is to consider relevant international norms as
well as the “situation prevailing elsewhere on the Peninsula.”  After the committee has
developed criteria, the OPZ provisions in the FTA lay out a three step process by
which products made in the KIC could be incorporated into the FTA.  First, the
committee must deem that an outward processing zone meets the criteria it has
established. Second, the two governments must agree that the FTA should be amended
accordingly.  Third, each government must seek “legislative approval for any
amendments to the Agreement with respect to outward processing zones.”  The
agreement does not lay out the size or composition of the committee, or how
committee members will be chosen, or the procedures by which the committee is to
arrive at decisions.120
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In the KORUS FTA negotiations, the United States backed away from the
principle of its initial position of not ever expanding the KORUS FTA to North
Korea-made products, a significant achievement for South Korea. At the same time,
the United States appeared to give up little in substance in the near-to-middle term.
The United States apparently would be able to control the decision to and pace of any
move to grant preferential treatment to North Korea-made products.  Any perceptions
of foot-dragging by the United States, however, may come at a diplomatic price if
future South Korean governments push for more rapid integration of North Korean
industrial zones into the FTA.
Two important issues for the United States in considering South Korea’s demand
were the conditions for North Korean workers and the income the KIC provides for
the North Korean government.  Some U.S. labor and human rights advocates have
argued that North Korean workers in Kaesong are being exploited.  South Korean
officials, as well as other analysts, counter by saying that conditions at Kaesong are
far better than those in the rest of North Korea.  Additionally, the North Korean
government derives hard currency from several sources in the KIC project, including
leasing fees and surcharges levied on North Korean workers’ wages, which are paid
to an arm of the North Korean government agency before being passed on to
employees (in the form of North Korean won).  To date, these revenue streams are
likely to be relatively small, though not insignificant, given the small size of the North
Korean economy and its shortage of hard currency.  If the most ambitious goals for
the Kaesong project are realized, by the middle of the next decade the North Korean
government would likely derive tens if not hundreds of millions of dollars annually
from tax revenues and its slice of North Korean workers’ wages, assuming the KIC’s
current tax and wage structures remain in place.121  Some South Koreans caution that
the uncertainties over the future course of the KIC project make such projections
highly speculative.
Foreign Investment
Foreign investment is becoming an increasingly significant element in the U.S.-
South Korean bilateral economic relationship.  Over the past 10 years, the stock of
U.S.-South Korean foreign direct investment (FDI), valued on an historical cost basis,
has increased substantially, due in no small part to the market-oriented reforms South
Korea undertook after its 1997 financial crisis.  In 1997, the value of stock of U.S. FDI
in South Korea was $6.5 billion and had increased to $22.3 billion by the end of 2006.
In 2006, 43% of U.S. FDI in South Korea was in manufacturing, especially in
computers and electronic products, chemicals, and other manufacturing facilities.  The
remainder of the FDI was in services, with U.S. FDI in banking and other financial
services accounting for much of this investment.  South Korean FDI in the United
States has also increased substantially in the last 10 years, albeit from a much lower
base.  In 1997, the stock of South Korean FDI in the United States was valued at $0.6
billion and had increased to $8.6 billion by the end of 2006. $7.2 billion, or 84% of
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this investment was in wholesale trade, perhaps reflecting the sharp retail facilities
to sell South Korean-made vehicles in the United States.122
Foreign investment has been a sensitive issue in U.S.-South Korean relations for
many years as U.S. investors have tried to make inroads into the South Korean
economy.  U.S. investors’ criticisms have included restrictions on foreign investment
in key sectors, such as communications and lack of adequate protection for intellectual
property.  (See section on IPR provisions of the KORUS FTA.) Efforts to establish
bilateral rules have failed in the past.  In the 1990s, the two countries tried to negotiate
a bilateral investment treaty (BIT), that would commit each party to provide national
treatment to the investments from the other party and abstain from performance
requirements for foreign investments from the other party.  But the negotiations
collapsed largely over U.S. opposition to South Korea’s so-called screen quota on
domestic films and the latter’s resistence to lifting or reducing it.  (The South Korean
government reduced the screen quotas by half just before the KORUS FTA
negotiations were launched in February 2006.)  The KORUS FTA chapter on
investment essentially contains the commitments that would otherwise have been in
a BIT.
The FTA sets down general principals for the treatment by South Korea and
the United States of investors and investments from one partner in the territory of the
other.123  The principle of national treatment– that one party to the agreement will treat
covered investments and investors from the other party no-less favorably than it treats
domestic investors and investments– is paramount.  The FTA allows each party to
make exceptions to the national treatment principle, but those exceptions must be
specified in the relevant annexes to the agreement.124 A second fundamental principal
is most-favored-nation treatment (MFN)– the two parties agree to treat investors and
investments from the other no less favorably than it treats investors and investments
from third, non-party countries.  A third principle is minimum standard of treatment,
that is, each party shall accord to all covered investments treatment in accordance with
customary international law, including fair and equitable treatment and full protection
and security.
The KORUS FTA would set limits on government expropriation of covered
investments – that they be only for public purpose and carried out in a non-
discriminatory manner, and affected investors would be provided with prompt and
adequate compensation (fair market value).  It also would require each KORUS FTA
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partner-country government allow for the free transfer of financial capital pertaining
to covered investments both into and out of the country with exceptions, such as cases
related to criminal offenses.  The KORUS FTA would prohibit the U.S. and South
Korean governments from imposing performance requirements (domestic content
requirements, export-ratios, import limits, etc.) on the investments from the other.  It
would allow exceptions for measures intended to accomplish social objectives, such
as to increase employment in certain regions of the country, promote training of
workforce, and protect the environment.  The agreement would also prohibit a
requirement that senior managers be of a particular nationality but would  allow a
requirement that the majority of board of directors be of a particular nationality.
Similar to other U.S. FTAs, the KORUS FTA would establish procedures for
the settlement of investor-state disputes involving investments covered under the
agreement where the investor from one partner-country alleges that the government
of the other partner-country is violating his rights under the FTA.  The FTA stipulates
that the two parties should try to first resolve the dispute through consultations and
negotiations.  But, if that does not work, the agreement would  provide for arbitration
procedures and the establishment of tribunals as provided under the “Convention on
the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States.”
The USITC concluded that U.S. investors, especially investors in financial
services, would likely gain from the KORUS FTA.125  (See section on financial and
other services.)  The United States has been the predominate partner in terms of
foreign investment and stands to gain the most from the protections provided by the
KORUS FTA.  However, South Korean investments in the United States are
increasing, and therefore, South Korea could benefit as well.
Intellectual Property Rights
In addition to those sections addressing pharmaceutical manufacturing (see
discussion above), the KORUS FTA contains other provisions on intellectual property
rights (IPR) protection in U.S.-South Korean trade.  Under the FTA the United States
and South Korea would reaffirm their commitments under the WTO Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement and other international
agreements and conventions on intellectual property.  But the two countries would
make IPR commitments beyond those agreements with provisions that would:
! require each government to extend national treatment to IPR holders
from the other country;126
CRS-40
126
 (...continued)
Association of America.  June 6, 2007. p.7.  
127
 The FTA would require each Party to adopt and maintain five internationally-accepted
labor rights that are contained in the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights
at Work and Its Follow-Up (1998) (ILO Declaration)  Article 19:2 specifies these rights as
the freedom of association, the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining, the
elimination of all forms of compulsory or forced labor, the effective abolition of child labor
and the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation. The
framework also requires FTAs to adhere to seven major multilateral environmental
agreements and for this commitment to be enforceable under the FTA.  “The Trade Policy
for America” was completed after President Bush notified the Congress on April 1, 2007 of
his intention to sign the KORUS FTA but prior to the signing on June 30.  At first, South
Korean officials balked at opening negotiations to add the language but eventually agreed
to do so.  After, the two sides held negotiations, they included the language in the final text
that was signed on June 30, 2007.
! require transparency through the publication of regulations and laws
regarding intellectual property rights;
! facilitate the registration of and protection of trademarks and
established limitations on the use of geographical indications;
! ensure the right of authors, performers, producers of recordings to
determine use of copyrighted products;
! require copyright protection for no less than 70 years; thus, South
Korea agrees to extend its copyright protection term, an objective of
U.S. copyright holders;
! protect copyrighted material against piracy and provide penalties for
those who abet piracy including the seizure and destruction of pirated
and counterfeit products.;
! protect copyrighted performances on the internet; and
! protect encrypted programming over satellites and cable signals.
Labor Rights and Conditions 
On May 10, 2007, a bipartisan group of congressional leaders and the Bush
Administration released a statement that provided language to be included in pending
and future FTAs, including KORUS FTA.  Among other things, the statement, or
framework, called “The New Trade Policy for America, ” requires U.S. FTA partners
to commit to enforcing the five basic international labor standards and would require
that the commitment be enforceable under the FTA.127  Neither country is to waive or
otherwise derogate from its labor statutes that reflect the five labor rights in a manner
that affects trade or investment between the two FTA countries. Each country is to
ensure that those affected by their respective labor laws have access to tribunals that
enforce their rights under those laws.
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Under the KORUS FTA the two countries are to form a Labor Council made
up of officials responsible for labor matters in each country, that will meet within the
first year after the agreement enters into force.  At least one session of the Council will
be devoted to meeting with the public in each country to discuss matters related to the
enforcement of the labor provisions of the FTA.  Disputes regarding labor matters
under the FTA are to be resolved first by consultations, but if those fail, the parties in
dispute may take the matter to the Labor Council and eventually to a dispute
settlement panel if these mechanisms fail to resolve the dispute.  The KORUS FTA
also calls for the establishment of a Labor Cooperation Mechanism whereby the two
countries would develop and work in areas pertaining to labor rights in each country.
To many outside observers, South Korea’s labor rights regime is generally
considered to be strong for regular workers.  South Korea ranks in the top third of the
OECD’s thirty members in terms of employment protection for regular workers.128
Indeed, for years, a major complaint of U.S. multinationals is that restrictions in the
South Korean labor market, such as mandatory severance pay, significantly raise the
cost of investing and doing business in Korea.  In contrast, U.S. union representatives
argue that recent changes to make South Korean labor markets more flexible are
reducing the rights of South Korean workers.129 Korea’s unions have earned a
reputation for activism; the number of working days lost to strikes is regularly among
the highest in the OECD.  Hyundai Motors, for instance, has experienced a strike
every year since 1994.  Moreover, strikes in South Korea are notable in that they are
sometimes accompanied by violence and the occupation of workplaces and public
spaces (such as highways), to which the government often responds with police action.
In its comments on the KORUS FTA, the Labor Advisory Committee for Trade
Negotiations and Trade Policy (LAC), criticized South Korea for the imprisonment
of around 200 unionists who were “exercising basic labor rights” and for mobilizing
riot police against union activity.130
Korea’s labor pool is divided into two segments: 1) South Korean “salarymen”
(salaried workers, overwhelmingly men, in large corporations) who comprise less than
one-third of the workforce.  Over half of this segment of the workforce is represented
by powerful unions. 2) The remainder of the workforce, comprised of employees in
small-scale firms plus the country’s temporary and day laborers.  Few of these workers
are unionized.  The proportion of temporary workers has grown markedly, to nearly
one-third of the workforce, one of the highest rates in the industrialized world.131
These workers tend to receive low wages and receive limited coverage by the social
safety net, points highlighted by the LAC.  Labor markets are notoriously rigid.
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Government Procurement
A great deal of business is conducted by governments through the purchase of
goods and services for their own use.  Most governments, including the United States
have laws (The Buy American Act) which require such goods and services to be of
domestic origin.  However, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and
now the WTO have some provisions, the WTO Government Procurement Agreement
(GPA), under which the countries agree to open up some of their government
procurement business, to foreign companies as a way to promote trade.  This
agreement is plurilateral, that is it only applies to those WTO members that have
signed it.  The United States and South Korea are among the 39 signatories to the
GPA.  The GPA established rules for governments to publish information about
contract tenders, including technical specification, about qualification for suppliers,
the awarding of contracts, with a specific emphasis on nondiscrimination and
transparency in the conduct of government procurement.
The KORUS FTA reaffirms the GPA as a baseline for government
procurement but would expand the criteria to include more contracts. The GPA
applies to contracts valued at around $193,000 and above.  The KORUS FTA would
apply agreement to contracts valued at $100,000 and above, potentially increasing the
value of bilateral government-procurement trade.  The GPA applies only to contracts
tendered by 79 U.S. Federal government agencies and by 42 South Korean central and
subcentral agencies listed in the annex.  Under the KORUS FTA, South Korea would
add nine more agencies to be covered.
Environment Protection
In keeping with the May 2007 agreement on labor and the environment
between the Bush Administration and congressional leaders, under the KORUS FTA,
the United States and South Korea would commit to enforce a list of seven
multilateral environmental agreements to which both are parties and to add to the list
when other agreements enter into force.  (See the Labor Rights and Conditions section
above.)132In addition, the FTA would prevent the two countries from easing
environmental standards in order to allow firms on their territory from gaining a
competitive trade advantage.  Furthermore, violations of the environmental provisions
are to handled in the same manner as commercial provisions through the dispute
settlement mechanism of the KORUS FTA and subject to trade sanctions,
unprecedented for U.S. FTAs.
Transparency
Making information publically available is a fundamental principle imbedded
in international trade rules and in each of the FTAs that the United States has entered
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into.  For years U.S. exporters and trade negotiators identified the lack of transparency
of South Korea’s trading and regulatory systems as one of the most significant barriers
to trade with South Korea, in almost every major product sector.  Under KORUS
FTA, the United States and South Korea would commit to publish relevant regulations
and administrative decisions as well as proposed regulations; to allow persons from
the other party to make comments and to ask questions regarding proposed
regulations; to notify such persons of administrative proceedings and to allow them
make presentations before final administrative action is taken; and to allow such
persons to request review and appeal of administrative decisions.
Institutional Provisions and Dispute Settlement
The KORUS FTA would provide several options for the United States and
South Korea to resolve disputes arising under the agreement, in addition to the special
dispute settlement provisions under the foreign investment chapter and other chapters.
 KORUS FTA  would require the two countries to establish a joint committee chaired
by the USTR and the Minister of Foreign Trade or their designees to supervise the
implementation of the agreement.  The committee would establish a panel to
adjudicate disputes between the two countries under the agreement, if consultations
do not lead to a resolution of the dispute.  Annex 22A of the KORUS FTA contains
provisions for the settlement of disputes regarding motor vehicles, specifically the
snap-back provision. (See discussion in section on auto trade.)  Annex 22-B provides
for eventual discussion of the inclusion of products made in outward processing zones
in North Korea. (For more information, see discussion in Kaesong Industrial Park
section.)
Other Technical Provisions
The KORUS FTA includes other sets of provisions intended to facilitate
market access. Technical barriers to trade are standards and regulations that are
intended ostensibly to protect the health and safety of consumers and for other
legitimate non-trade purposes but may through design and implementation
discriminate against imports.  The KORUS FTA would commit both countries to
uphold their obligations under the WTO Agreement on Technical  Barriers to Trade
(TBT).  In addition, South Korea and the United States would promote transparency,
by allowing persons from the other party to participate in the development of
standards, technical regulations, and conformity assessment procedures.
Regarding customs administration and trade facilitation, the KORUS FTA
would promote joint cooperation to ensure compliance with each other’s customs laws
and regulations.  For example, it would require the two countries to adopt procedures
and regulations to facilitate express delivery shipments.
Rules of origin define what are goods that originate in the FTA region and
therefore are eligible for preferential treatment.  (Textiles and apparel have separate
rules of origin).  The KORUS FTA would require that goods must be wholly obtained
or produced in the territory of both countries or country.  The FTA would set a
regional value threshold to be met to be considered originating in the FTA territory
and provides formulas for determining the regional values.
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National competition laws and regulations are intended to ensure that one
firm does not so dominate a sector of the economy as to inhibit market entry and stifle
competition.  Among other things, the KORUS FTA would require that the United
States and South Korea inform  persons, who are subject to administrative actions, of
hearings and provide them the opportunity to make their case.  The two countries
would  cooperate in enforcing  competition laws through the exchange of information
and consultation.  In addition, designated monopolies and state-enterprises would have
to operate in conformance with the agreement and in accordance with commercial
considerations.
The KORUS FTA includes provisions to facilitate  trade via electronic
commerce (e-commerce).  They would prohibit discrimination against digital
products and imposing customs duties on these products.  They would also require the
recognition of electronic authentication and electronic signatures and would promote
consumer access to the Internet.
Next Steps, Implications, and the Emerging Debate
The United States concluded and entered into (signed) the KORUS FTA
within the parameters of the Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) under the Bipartisan
Trade Promotion Act of 2002.  (P.L.107-210)  Therefore, any implementing
legislation would be subjected to expedited procedures, that is mandatory
congressional consideration, limited debate, no amendments, and an up-or-down vote.
TPA does not impose a deadline on the President to submit the draft implementing
bill.  It is generally assumed that the President would do so only when he expects to
have sufficient support in Congress to pass it, although he could submit the bill
without that assurance and risk the bill’s failure.  Developments on the beef issue are
being closely watched for clues to the KORUS FTA’s future.  It is widely believed
that the agreement will have a much more difficult time in Congress if South Korea
maintains its restrictions on imports of U.S. beef.
In terms of broader U.S. trade policy, an FTA with South Korea would build
on the Bush Administration policy of “competitive liberalization” that uses free trade
agreements to encourage trading partners to remove trade and investment barriers and
be a model for others.  In that sense, the KORUS FTA would be a major step forward
in the policy.  It would be the largest U.S. FTA in terms of mutual trade and
investment, since the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) went into
effect in 1994.  The Bush Administration was also responding to criticisms that FTAs
that the United States has entered into since NAFTA that have had only minuscule
effects on trade flows and on the U.S. economy.  The Administration was also using
the KORUS FTA to respond to the increasing economic influence of China which is
also pursuing FTAs in East Asia.  Some observers have suggested that the KORUS
FTA could spark interest of other East Asian countries, such as Japan, to negotiate
FTAs with the United States in order not to lose their share of the huge U.S. market
to South Korea.
In South Korea, the KORUS FTA must be ratified by a majority vote in the
unicameral National Assembly to take effect.  Unlike in the United States, trade
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agreements are not subject to any fast-track time lines.  Current president Roh Moo-
hyun and president-elect Lee Myung Bak, who was elected in December 2007, have
agreed to push for the FTA’s passage before Roh’s term expires in late February
2008.133  Lee belongs to the right-of-center Grand National Party, while Roh hails
from the “progressive” or left-wing side of the political spectrum.  Most opinion polls
show a majority of South Koreans in favor of the agreement, though opposition has
been intense from rural interests, among others.  The KORUS FTA was not a
significant issue in the 2007 presidential election campaign, despite the fact that one
of the major candidates opposed the agreement.
For South Korea, entering an FTA with the United States meshes with a
number of Roh and Lee’s economic and strategic goals.  Ongoing competitive
pressure from Japanese firms, increased competition from Chinese enterprises, and
the rapid aging of the South Korean workforce has heightened the sense of urgency
to boost national long-term competitiveness, particularly in the services industries,
where South Korean productivity typically lags compared to other industrialized
countries.  Indeed, President Roh and other South Korean officials have argued that
the KORUS FTA is essential for South Korea’s economic survival.134  Similarly, if
less grandiosely, President elect-Lee has argued that passage of the KORUS FTA will
help revitalize South Korea’s economy.  To accelerate Korea’s reform efforts — and
also to avoid being left out from other FTAs being created globally and in Asia —
President Roh pursued an aggressive effort to negotiate FTAs South Korea has entered
into FTAs with Chile, Singapore, the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and is negotiating with other
countries, including the European Union.135
The United States and South Korea negotiated the KORUS FTA in part as a
means to restore the health of a critical foreign policy and national security alliance.136
While the talks were ongoing, the KORUS FTA sometimes was discussed as a
possible counterweight to the bilateral friction that was occurring over issues such as
how to manage relations with North Korea and re-positioning of U.S. troops in South
Korea.  These tensions decreased markedly in 2007, following the Bush
Administration’s decision to place greater emphasis on engagement and negotiations
with North Korea.  The December 2007 election of conservative party leader Lee
Myung-Bak, who has stressed the importance of rebuilding U.S.-South Korean ties,
is expected to further improve relations.  Thus, with the alliance apparently on firmer
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ground, the KORUS FTA no longer appears as an exceptional area of bilateral
cooperation.
However, although the FTA’s utility as an acute salve for the alliance has been
reduced, over the medium and longer term, it could help to boost the alliance by
deepening bilateral economic and political ties.  The tensions over North Korea
policy, which may resurface, have revealed the extent to which the two countries view
North Korea differently.  Most South Koreans’ sense of threat from North Korea has
declined over the past decade, even as Americans’ threat perceptions have risen.  With
the central rationale for the alliance – deterring a North Korean attack – now open to
question in South Korea, and with many South Koreans opposed to allowing U.S.
troops in South Korea to deploy to other parts of Asia (such as the Taiwan Strait) in
the event of a crisis, the future utility and form of the U.S.-South Korean alliance is
being debated.  Entering into an FTA, some argue, is a way to help reorient the
alliance to adapt to the changes on the Korean Peninsula and in East Asia.
Another implication of the signing of the KORUS FTA is that it has become
something of a symbol of the depth of the U.S. commitment to the U.S.-South Korean
alliance and to the U.S. forward presence in East Asia.  Many Asians believe that the
United States is disengaging from the region.  If the South Korean National Assembly
ratifies the pact and the FTA either is rejected or not introduced in the United States,
many Koreans and Asians may regard this as an additional sign of U.S.
disengagement, at a time when other great powers like Japan and China are increasing
their economic diplomacy.  It may also discourage other countries from negotiating
FTAs with the United States.
In the United States, the KORUS FTA could become as controversial as
NAFTA has turned out to be.  While a broad swath of the U.S. business community
supports the agreement, strong opposition from some groups– auto and steel
manufacturers, labor, for example–and the resistance of the agricultural community
to supporting the agreement until South Korea lifts its restrictions on imports of U.S.
beef, almost guarantee that KORUS FTA will generate vigorous debate.  Differences
over the implications of the KORUS FTA between the White House and the
Democratic leadership in the Congress have made the timing and even the likelihood
of the President’s submission and the Congress’s subsequent consideration of
implementing legislation uncertain.137
As discussed earlier, the agreement has generated strong support and
opposition in various quarters.  Supporters point to South Korean commitments to
eliminate tariffs on most manufactured and agricultural goods, liberalize trade in
services, reduce barriers to foreign investment, and strengthen protection of
intellectual property rights.  Supporters have also cited the FTAs that South Korea has
signed or is negotiating, such as the one with the European Union, arguing that failure
to approve the KORUS FTA would place U.S. firms and investors at a competitive
disadvantage in South Korea with their counterparts from those other countries.  Some
proponents also argue that the KORUS FTA is important to uphold the U.S.-South
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Korean alliance, the bilateral relationship would be harmed if the agreement were not
approved.
On the other hand, some opponents of the KORUS FTA assert that South
Korea does not go far enough to address U.S. problems with access to the its market
and that failure to resolve these issues, such as barriers to the auto market, would
constitute a wasted opportunity; therefore, the agreement needs to be renegotiated
before it can be approved by Congress.  Others oppose the KORUS FTA on more
general grounds.  Some trade experts, for example, assert that FTAs undermine efforts
to build a multilateral trade system under the WTO and create tangled webs of
conflicting trade rules that impede rather than promote trade.  Others are skeptical or
opposed to trade liberalization per se because they assert trade does more harm than
good to U.S. workers and to the U.S. economy in general.  Clearly, any debate on the
merits of the KORUS FTA will involve many factors for Members to weigh.
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Appendix A: South Korea’s restrictions on Imports
of U.S. Beef
South Korea's concern about the potential human health impacts of U.S. beef dates
back to December 2003, when its government banned imports of U.S. beef after a
Canadian-born cow in Washington state tested positive for bovine spongiform
encephalopathy (BSE) or mad cow disease.  The loss of the third largest export market
together with other major foreign markets for U.S. beef contributed to a sharp fall in
U.S. cattle prices.  In 2003, the $815 million (246,595 MT) in U.S. beef exports to
South Korea had accounted for 21% of the $3.9 billion in beef products shipped
worldwide.  Subsequent talks over the terms that would apply before sales could
resume took two years to complete.  In January 2006, South Korea agreed to allow
imports of only U.S. boneless beef from cattle less than 30 months old.  U.S.
negotiators had signaled this type of response was necessary before negotiations with
South Korea on a comprehensive FTA could begin.  However, in late 2006 South
Korean inspectors rejected the first three shipments of U.S. beef, after discovering
small bone fragments in a few boxes of packaged frozen boneless beef.  U.S. efforts
to resolve this and related issues of beef access to the Korean market subsequently
became contentious.  USTR decided not to participate for several weeks in the FTA's
sanitary and phytosanitary working group.  Also, bilateral discussions on this issue
moved from the technical level to high-level conversations as both sides raced to
conclude KORUS FTA by the end of March 2007 deadline.
Although the beef issue was not resolved in the FTA talks, South Korea's
President Roh on April 1, 2007, stated he had personally promised President Bush that
his government would "uphold the [yet to-be-released] recommendations" of the
World Organization for Animal Health (OIE)138 on the BSE risk status of the United
States and "open the Korean [beef] market at a reasonable level."  On May 22, 2007,
the OIE formally found that the United States is a "controlled risk" country for the
spread of mad cow disease.  This means that internationally-recommended, science-
based measures are in place to effectively manage any possible risk of BSE in the U.S.
cattle population.  The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) immediately
requested South Korea to amend its import requirements for U.S. beef within a
specified time frame to reflect this risk determination and to reopen its market to all
U.S. cattle and beef products.  In response, South Korea's animal health regulatory
agency began an 8-step process to assess the BSE risks of the U.S. beef sector in light
of the OIE finding, with the intent to negotiate a revised bilateral agreement that
would lay out import rules applicable to U.S. beef.  Initial expectations were that this
process would be completed by late September 2007.  However, the discovery of
prescribed risk materials in some boxes of U.S. beef (see below) and the South Korean
government's apparent desire to defer negotiations until after the December 19th
presidential election suggest a revised agreement on beef import rules might not be
finalized at the earliest until spring 2008.
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Against the backdrop of these developments, U.S. boneless beef exports to
South Korea nevertheless resumed.  From late April through early October 2007,
Korea's regulatory agency inspected and cleared for retail sale most U.S. boneless beef
shipments, applying its interpretation of the January 2006 agreement.  Even with
partial-year exports, South Korea ranked as the 4th largest market for U.S. beef
through September 2007.  With a third discovery of bone and/or spinal matter in a box
of packaged beef, South Korean authorities announced on October 5, 2007 they would
not conduct any more inspections of U.S. beef shipments until both sides conclude
formal negotiations to revise the 2006 protocol.  In an effort to move toward that goal,
bilateral technical-level talks held October 11-12, 2007, failed to bring both sides
closer to an agreement.  South Korean officials sought rules that are reportedly more
strict than OIE guidelines, intended to reportedly correct four shortcomings in the U.S.
measures taken to limit BSE risks.  The U.S. stance is that current rules already meet
OIE standards.139
In formal negotiations (which have not yet been scheduled), the United States
is expected to continue to press for full access in one step for U.S. beef.  This would
mean expanding the scope of the 2006 agreement to also include exports of bone-in
beef and coverage of all U.S. beef from cattle regardless of age, as long as BSE-risk
materials are removed during processing.  South Korea's trade minister on November
9 signaled that his government instead prefers a "two-phased" approach to a full
opening, claiming this could help persuade the public to more easily accept U.S. beef.
The first step would be to allow imports of both boneless and bone-in (rib) beef cuts
from U.S. cattle less than 30 months old, as long as risk materials are removed
following OIE's guidelines.  The minister argued this would give the United States
about 80% of its market share before the late 2003 restrictions took effect.  The
eventual second step would permit imports of beef from older cattle, as long as risk
materials are removed according to OIE's specifications.140
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Appendix B: South Korean Motor Vehicle
Manufacturing 
 
South Korea came late to the table of major motor vehicle manufacturing
nations.  The 1980 edition of the Automotive News Market Data Book, an authoritative
industry source, listed no South Korean production in its world table covering the
period 1946-78, and no South Korean company among the top 50 global producers.
By 1988, according to the same publication’s 1990 edition, total South Korean car and
truck production exceeded one million units.  In the 2007 edition, total South Korean
production of cars and trucks in 2006 is given as more than 3.8 million units, which
ranks South Korea as the global number five national producer, behind, in order,
Japan, the United States, China and Germany.  Yet South Korea remains only a mid-
level consumer of motor vehicles.  Its national sales of 1.2 million ranked its market
not only well behind the top three leading producers, but also behind each of the five
largest western European nations, plus Russia, Brazil, India, and Canada, and just
ahead of Mexico.  Exports account for about 70% of Korea’s motor vehicle
production volume, a figure that is matched by no other major motor vehicle
producing country.
South Korea has aggressively developed and protected a nationally owned
automotive manufacturing base.  Motor vehicle imports were prohibited in South
Korea until 1987, and imports from Japan were banned until 1999.141  Originally the
South Korean government promoted the development of a fleet of domestically owned
producers, but this strategy failed. In the shakeout after Korea’s economic crisis of
1997-98, only one major South Korean-owned company was left, Hyundai, which also
took control of  the number-two producer by volume, Kia.  Others were marginalized,
out of the business altogether, or controlled by foreign companies.  Korea’s third
producer, and their only other major manufacturer left in the business, Daewoo, is
now controlled by General Motors.142  The lone major South Korean-owned producer,
the Hyundai-Kia combination, in 2006 produced 3.8 million vehicles worldwide,
ranking it number six globally.  Of this output, 2.7 million vehicles were
manufactured in South Korea, 72% of the country’s total output of cars and light
trucks, and more than double the total sales of all vehicles in South Korea.143
While Hyundai is a world-class global competitor, with current and planned
assembly operations in the United States and other countries, it is questionable
whether Hyundai, or any other South Korean-owned firm, could maintain an
independently operated market base in South Korea without continued formal and
informal protection from the national government.  Comparative analysis of motor
vehicle import and sales data by CRS from the Automotive News Global Market Data
CRS-51
144
 Maxton and Wormald, pp. 101-2.
145
 Schott (August 2007), table 2 and p. 4.  It may be argued that Hyundai’s U.S. sales of its
Sonata sedan, which may be considered a “medium” or “large” vehicle in Korea, were
sourced out of its Alabama assembly plant starting in 2005, thus reducing the export share
of that product.  However, according to Ward’s Automotive Yearbook, only 91,000 Hyundai
vehicles were produced in the U.S. in the startup year of 2005. 
Book and Ward’s Motor Vehicle Facts & Figures indicates that import penetration in
the South Korean market in 2005 was equal to 3% of sales, even lower than the 5%
level in Japan.  By comparison, the U.S. level was 39% (20% if imports from Canada
and Mexico are excluded), and in major European producer countries, Canada, and
Mexico, the shares of imports were 50% or higher.  The British authors Maxton and
Wormald believe that the South Korean industry may be fated to become a
“networked” producer in the long run, i.e., surviving only by linkages to other major
market producers.144
Jeffery Schott of the Peterson Institute for International Economics has
presented an analysis  of South Korean automotive production and shipments in 2005,
based on Korean official statistics, which illustrates that large shares of South Korean
vehicles of all types are exported.  Among passenger cars, however, the significance
of exports tends to decline with the size of the vehicle.  The export share of South
Korean-produced vehicles officially described as “light” was 69%, and of “small”
vehicles was 82%.  For “medium” cars, the export share dropped to 62%, and for
“large” cars, the share was 53%.  Schott noted that Ford and Chrysler representatives
“argue that South Korean tariff and nontariff barriers have restricted the supply of
imported large vehicles – which traditionally have higher profit margins – to reserve
a large share of the market for domestic producers ... a surprisingly high percentage
of South Korean production of larger cars is sold in the domestic market rather than
exported, and these are cars that most directly compete with imports.”145
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Appendix C: South Korea’s Entry into the Visa
Waiver Program
A priority issue for Seoul that was not formally part of the FTA talks was
South Korea’s status in the U.S. Visa Waiver Program (VWP), under which foreigners
traveling from certain countries are permitted to travel to the United States for up to
90 days without obtaining a visa.146  Although South Korea’s participation in the VWP
was not formally part of the KORUS FTA talks, any changes made by the United
States in this area are likely to play a political role in selling the agreement in Seoul.
South Korea is one of the United States’ largest sources of foreign visitors. In FY2006
there were 750,360 short term visitors for business or pleasure from South Korea. For
years, Korean-American groups and American multinationals operating in South
Korea also have called for South Korea to be added to the VWP.  Since at least 2005,
the VWP issue has been a regular feature of summit meetings between President Bush
and South Korean President Roh.  During their November 2005 summit, President
Bush announced that the United States would work with Seoul to develop a “roadmap
to assist South Korea in meeting the requirements for membership” in the Visa
Waiver Program, making South Korea one of 13 “roadmap”countries.147
Among the statutory requirements for countries to participate in the VWP is
that the country must have a nonimmigrant visa refusal rate of below 3%.148
According to State Department officials, South Korea’s nonimmigrant visa refusal
rates have consistently been over this threshold.  The FY2005 rate was 3.7% and the
FY2006 rate was 3.6%.149  Meeting the refusal rate is not the only requirement.  A
country’s participation in the VWP must also be deemed to be in the economic, law
enforcement, and security interests of the United States.  Since the late 1990s, no
country has been added to the VWP, an indication of the difficulty in meeting the
participation requirements.
In the summer of 2007, Congress passed and President Bush signed H.R. 1
(P.L. 110-53), the Implementing the 9/11 Commission Recommendations Act of
2007, which includes a provision (§711) that reforms the VWP by, among other
measures, allowing the Secretary of Homeland Security to waive the refusal rate
requirement  However, P.L. 110-53 that the refusal rate waivers can only be granted
after the United States implements an exit system at its airports that can verify the
CRS-53
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 For more, see CRS Report RL32234, U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator
Technology (US-VISIT) Program, by Lisa M. Seghetti and Stephen R. Vina.
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departure of not less than 97% of foreign nationals that exit through U.S. airports, and
after the United States establishes an electronic travel authorization system.150  Many
argue the implementation of both systems is still years away.151
